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In the nearly ten years since Peru privatized major State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), the overall impact of the process is not yet clear. This paper analyzes 
the impact of privatization through a detailed statistical and econometric 
analysis of first difference (the difference between pre- and post-privatization 
performance), and second difference (change in performance of privatized firms 
relative to the change in performance of SOEs) of several indicators on 
profitability, operating efficiency, employment, leverage and convergence. The 
results, which showed that privately owned firms are more efficient and more 
profitable than otherwise comparable state owned firms, were consistent with 
previous literature. In the case of the most competitive sector, the financial 
system, the newly privatized banks converged towards the leading private banks 
over time. While the impact of privatization on employment is negative in the 
short-run, there are more positive impacts in the long term, especially since 
SOEs traditionally hire employees for political rather than technical reasons. 
This paper demonstrates that, as the result of privatization, there is a significant 
increase in indirect employment through services and significant growth of total 
employment—both direct and indirect. 
 
JEL: L970, L960, L950, L500, L430, D600 
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31. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades, countries around the world have embarked on major privatization 
programs, yet many remain reluctant to privatize while still more have had to halt ongoing 
processes of privatization. This is particularly true in developing countries, where State-
Owned Enterprises (SOE) still account for more than 10 percent of gross domestic product, 
20 percent of investment and about five percent of formal employment (Kikeri, Nellis, and 
Shirley, 1994). The aversion to privatization appears to be associated with public distrust of 
the privatization process. Unions and other traditional opponents of privatization have argued 
that it results in layoffs and poorer services. Political leaders, meanwhile, fear that the higher 
profitability of private companies comes at the expense of the rest of society, especially 
during the difficult transition period from state ownership to private ownership. 
The transfer from the public to the private sector (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) 
necessarily implies a change in the relationships between those responsible for the firm’s 
decisions and the beneficiaries of the profit flows (the social view and the agency view). In 
general, the transfer of property rights leads to a different structure of management 
incentives, causing changes in managerial behavior, company performance, and quality of 
service in terms of access and use, but in the words of Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole 
(1993), “theory alone is thus unlikely to be conclusive in this respect.” Empirical work, then, 
is crucial.  
Nevertheless, there is still little empirical knowledge about how well privatization has 
worked. There are difficult methodological problems as well as special problems with data 
availability and consistency. Furthermore, the possibility of sample selection bias can arise 
from several sources, including a government’s desire to sugarcoat the process by privatizing 
the healthiest firms first. Megginson and Netter (2001) carried out a very detailed review of 
22 studies on non-transitional economies and concluded that Galal, Jones, Tandon, and 
Vogelsang (1994), La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), and the studies summarized in 
D’Souza and Megginson (1999) are the most solid and persuasive supporting the proposition 
that privatization improves the operating and financial performance of firms. The author 
considers La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) the finest study of an individual country, 
since it examines nearly the entire universe of Mexican privatizations. 
These studies, especially La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), investigate whether 
companies increase profits after privatization, whether privatization inflicts significant social 
losses, and, if so, through which channels. They conclude that the improved performance of 
4privatized firms is the result of significant restructuring efforts, not of market power 
exploitation, or massive layoffs and lower wages. In other words, firms undergo a harsh 
restructuring process following privatization and do not simply mark up prices and lower 
wages, as many economists have predicted. Deregulation, particularly the removal of 
price/quantity controls and trade barriers, is associated with faster convergence to industry 
benchmarks. The author suggests that the additional revenues and increased tax revenues the 
government receives from privatizations are probably enough to offset the cost of job losses 
to society. 
Newly-privatized firms cut employment, usually reducing the roll of white and blue-
collar workers by nearly half. These numbers may actually underestimate the effects of 
privatization, since in the years before, most companies have already trimmed payrolls in 
order to prepare for divestiture. These findings suggest that transfers from workers to 
shareholders play a role in the success of privatization. However, productivity gains resulted 
in large real wage increases of 114 percent in the post-privatization period.  
La Porta and López-de-Silanes showed, for example, that privatized firms increased 
sales 54.3 percent, despite workforce reductions and only modest increases in capital. 
Surprisingly, prices rose only 2.9 percent relative to the Producer Price Index. La Porta and 
López-de-Silanes also decomposed reported increases in profitability. Approximately 10 
percent of the gain in profits was attributable to higher prices and 33 percent to worker 
layoffs, while productivity gains accounted for the remaining 57 percent. Some of the social 
effects of higher prices and layoffs were offset by corporate taxes, which absorbed slightly 
more than half of the gains in operating income. 
In this study, the author follows a similar approach to La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 
(1999) by collecting information on nearly the entire population of privatized firms in order 
to evaluate the impact of Peruvian privatization. The author then compares the performance 
of those firms with the remaining SOEs and, when possible, with industry-matched private 
firms. Through this method, the impact of privatization on profitability ratios, operating 
efficiency ratios, labor indicators, and capital deepening indicators is analyzed. Even though 
the ultimate effect of changes in management incentives depends on the competitive and 
regulatory environment in which a given firm operates, it is argued that the degree of market 
competition and the effectiveness of regulatory policy has more important effects on 
performance than does change of ownership (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). This is extremely 
important in the case of the Peruvian privatization process because it was accompanied by 
large-scale sectoral reforms in which competitive structures and independent regulatory 
5agencies were established to monitor and promote competition in each sector. Therefore, 
variables needed to identify the roles played by the regulatory agencies and the competitive 
forces that determine firm performance (existence of a regulatory framework, autonomy of 
the regulatory agency, etc), are taken into account in the analysis. 
Peru’s privatization experience was rated one of the early success stories in Latin 
America. The privatization process, begun by then-President Alberto Fujimori, was launched 
as part of a rigorous process of stabilization and structural reform initiated in response to the 
crisis in the Peruvian economy. At the time, inflation had reached an annualized rate of 
36,000 percent, and per capita income had dropped to its lowest level in 30 years. Though 
privatization was not part of the initial set of reforms, it soon became a central plank of the 
overall reform program. 
By 2001, the privatization process involved 252 transactions, including 42 SOEs, 
brought US$9.2 billion in revenue (including capitalization) to the Treasury, and mobilized 
an additional US$11.4 billion in new investments. Nevertheless, Peru’s considerable success 
in attracting private participation and capital focused on a few sectors such as telecoms, 
electricity, banking, hydrocarbons and mining. Unlike some countries, such as Argentina and 
Bolivia, there has been virtually no private participation in the transportation, water, or 
sanitation sectors. Furthermore, as is the case in other countries, public support for 
privatization has been declining steadily—from 65 percent in May 1992 to less than 25 
percent by 2000. This decline has practically brought the privatization process to a halt. 
Written during a period of anti-privatization sentiment, this report is of special importance 
because it aims to analyze empirically the impact on performance of privatized SOEs.  
The study is organized as follows. After the introduction, the second section reviews 
the privatization process and its principal results. The third section summarizes the empirical 
methodology followed by the author, and the fourth section details the database they 
developed. The fifth section presents calculations of the differences in pre- and post-
privatization performance, difference in difference comparisons for which control groups 
were developed, and a panel data regression analysis of the static and dynamic performance 
of privatized firms relative to SOEs. The final section offers the authors’ conclusions. 
 
2. The Privatization Process 
 
At the beginning of 1990, Peru faced its worst macroeconomic situation ever (see Table 1). 
The country had never experienced such large and prolonged periods of inflation and 
recession. The economic model implemented in response to the crisis assigned the state a 
6central role in economic policy-making. The policies adopted by the government were not up 
to the challenge at hand: public expenditure and public internal credit rose impressively, price 
controls and subsidies were established, tariffs on public services were fixed, and exchange 
rate controls were set. These policies translated into a persistent fiscal imbalance and a 
considerable drop in tax revenues. In addition, the country faced a high underemployment 
rate and a striking decline in financial intermediation.
1 
The macroeconomic crisis affected Peru’s poorest citizens, around 43 percent of the 
1990 population, most of all. The situation worsened as public services, such as education 
and health, deteriorated. Additionally, the end of the decade saw an increase in informal 
economic activity, delinquency, drug trafficking and terrorism.  Furthermore, in 1990, Peru 
reached record underemployment (86.4 percent), while unemployment was around 8.3 
percent and formal employment barely reached 5.3 percent.
2  
Table 1. 
Main Macroeconomic Indicators 









1987-1992 1987-1992 1990 (%)
-4.9 733.1 7,649.60 -2.04
Source: Crisis and Reform in Latin America; Sebastian Edwards (World Bank).
 
In this context, public enterprises were characterized by inefficient provision of goods and 
services, ambiguous objectives, extensive intervention by politicians, decapitalization of 
investment resources, and a lack of fresh investment resources. Not surprisingly, then, public 
firms registered accumulated losses of more than US$4 billion in 1989-1990.
3  In an effort to 
reverse this situation, the Peruvian government decided to design an attractive normative and 
institutional framework for the purpose of promoting private investment as the main vehicle 
of economic growth. One of the key aspects of this new framework was a program to 
privatize public sector companies in 1991. 
In February 1991, the privatization process was launched with the enactment of 
Supreme Decree (SD) 041, which regulated and restructured the managerial activity of the 
State, even though the State was limited to managing no more than 23 companies. In 
                                                           
1 According to Apoyo (2002), during the second semester of 1985 the amount of banking deposits reached 23 
percent of GNP, while the same ratio fell to 5 percent in May 1990. Also, a similar drop occurred in the net 
internal credit of the banking system to the private sector (interest rates rose between 200 and 400 percent 
annually in real terms).   
2 These figures are for the Lima metropolitan area.  Source: Perú en Números 1991, Cuánto S.A. 
3 Apoyo (2002). 
7November 1991, the government extended more active and decisive support for the 
privatization process by enacting Legislative Decree (LD) 674, also known as the Promotion 
of Private Investment in State Companies. LD674 introduced the Commission for the 
Promotion of Private Investment (COPRI) and the Special Privatization Committees 
(CEPRIs), as well as private investment promotion schemes, which included sales of stocks 
and assets, service provision, concessions, and other items. In order to give more dynamic 
and political support to the process, President Fujimori appointed five state ministers to lead 
COPRI. These ministers were in charge of the general management of the privatization 
process; they had to establish the policies and objectives of the process, appoint CEPRIs to 
particular processes, and approve the most important decisions. CEPRIs were put in charge of 
the planning and execution of individual privatization processes.  
One of the most important laws enacted was LD662, or the “Law of Foreign 
Investment Promotion,” which mandated equal treatment of national and foreign capital. This 
law permitted foreign investment in all economic sectors and its execution through any legal 
administrative means. 
Diverse laws were then instituted in 1992 to facilitate the privatization process. The 
State was authorized to grant the safeties and guarantees necessary to protect foreign 
acquisitions and investments. Foreign investors were also granted facilities for the payment 
of taxes and debts owed by SOEs in the privatization process. In some cases, these 
commitments were suspended until the end of the process. 
In 1993, all of these reforms were written into law with the approval of the new 
Political Constitution. The new Constitution included the promotion of free private initiative, 
the establishment of equality between national and foreign investors, the encouragement of 
competition and equal treatment for all economic activities, and the guarantee of the 
possibility of the signing of Stability Agreements between private investors and the State. In 
addition, the State subscribed to many International Agreements for the protection of foreign 
investment and conflict solution through international arbiters.  
Together with the launching of the privatization program, the government undertook 
another set of structural reforms. Through these reforms, the government promoted market-
based competition and free international trade, installed policies to create a more flexible 
labor market, liberalized the financial system, eliminated price controls, and implemented 
sector reforms for the deregulation of markets. All the reforms carried out were 
complementary and necessary to the privatization program.  In so doing, the government 
recognized that adequate regulatory and institutional frameworks and a competitive market 
8for the product, and not just ownership, were determining factors in the success of the 
privatization process. 
Peru’s privatization scheme began in earnest between the months of November 1991 
and February 1992. Its main objective was simple: privatize as many public companies as 
quickly as possible. The initial tasks carried out were defining privatization methods, 
prioritizing the public enterprises to be privatized (which depended on their importance and 
the ease with which they could be privatized), and creating the CEPRIs.
4 The most common 
practice adopted for privatization was the public auction, due to its transparent and 
competitive scheme. 
In the following years, the design of an appropriate juridical-legal framework for the 
development of private investment continued. One particularly important law provided for 
the regulation of immigration applications and facilitated the nationalization of foreign 
citizens who wanted to provide capital and invest in Peru. 
The results of the privatization process were outstanding. Beyond the simple transfer 
of assets, companies were purchased and significant amounts of investment were committed 
(see Table 2 for details). In 1991, two public companies were privatized (Sogewiese Leasing 
and Buenaventura Mine). In 1992, under an operational COPRI and various CEPRIS, ten 
SOEs were privatized, drawing in revenues of US$208 millions and US$706 million in 
projected investment. In 1993, the process gathered momentum and 13 companies were 
privatized for a total of US$317 million and projected investment of US$589 million. The 
next year the government sold its natural monopolies in the telecommunications and 
electricity sectors, which resulted in US$2,579 million in revenues collected and a total 
amount of US$2,050 million of projected investments. 
                                                           
4 In February 1992, the first 26 CEPRIs initiated their operations. 
9 
Table 2 
Privatization Amounts ($ Millions) 
 
TRANSACTIONS 










1991  2.6       2.6   
1992  207.5    1.4    208.9 706.0 
1993  316.7 20.7  6.5    343.9 589.3 
1994  2579.2    4.7 610.8  3194.7  2050.0 
1995  1089.0 6.6  9.1  120.1  1224.8  70.1 
1996  2281.8 344.2  2.7  40.0  2668.7  2695.0 
1997  447.1 99  8.8  126.4  681.3  706.2 
1998  251.8 35.1  5.2    292.1 220.6 
1999  286.3 10.9  3.1    300.3 166.6 
Total  7462.0 516.5  41.5  897.3  8917.3  7203.8 
    Source: Commission for the Promotion of Private Investment (COPRI). 
 
During 1995 and 1996, the privatization process accelerated and deepened. Sixty-four 
companies were privatized, producing revenue of US$3,370 million and investment 
commitments of US$2,765 million. This continued in 1997 when 25 more companies were 
transferred for US$447 million and projected investments of US$706 million. In 1998, the 
privatization process made way for the concessionary process of transportation 
infrastructure.
5 CEPRIs were created for the concession of airports, ports, road networks, and 
mobile telephone bands, among other facilities. 
Between 1991 and 2001, Peru’s privatization and concessionary processes generated 
revenues totaling US$9.5 billion (including capitalizations) and investment commitments of 
approximately US$11.45 billion. Graph 1 shows the evolution of the privatization process 
and the timeline for the transfer of nearly all public enterprises over the last 10 years. Graph 2 
shows the revenues of the privatization process outlined by sector and company.
6 In regard to 
privatization practices, a total of 203 operations were carried out, representing US$7.85 
billion of revenues and US$6.4 billion of investment commitments. Concessions raised 
US$726 million and US$4.60 billion, respectively. 
Most of the privatization process occurred in the telecommunications, electricity, 
finance, mining and hydrocarbons sectors. Graph 3 shows how much privatization occurred 
                                                           
5 This meant the creation of PROMCEPRI (Comission for the Promotion of Private Concessions) in 1997, 
which was later absorbed by COPRI. 
6 The slowdown between 1997 and 2000 is attributable to domestic and foreign factors: namely, the Russian crisis, 
“El Niño,” the Peruvian political crisis, and others. 
10in each of the various sectors. Telecommunications and finance are already entirely 
privatized. In fact, telecommunications, electricity, finance and mining represent more than 
75 percent of revenues collected by the Peruvian government.  Nevertheless, to the present 
there has been virtually no private participation in the transportation, water, or sanitation 
sectors, and there are still sectors, such as agriculture, where much remains unprivatized. 
11 
Graph 1 
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Privatization Revenues By Sector ($ Millions) 


















Privatization Process Progress (1991-2000) 












Despite the increase in government revenues and future investment commitments, 
public approval of the privatization process has decreased steadily, as shown in Graph 4. 
Therefore, in order to develop a complete picture of the impact of privatization on other 
fundamental areas of the Peruvian economy, the results of previous privatization studies must 
be complemented by a detailed analysis of the impact on firm performance. 
 
Graph 4 










91.12  92.12  93.12  94.12 95.12 96.12 97.12 98.12 99.12 
Rate of Approval of 








91.12  92.12  93.12  94.12 95.12 96.12 97.12 98.12 99.12 




This report evaluates the privatization process by analyzing the performance of all 
privatized firms in Peru. The paper studies a sample of firms representing 63 percent of the 
13privatized SOEs and 91 percent of the transactions involved in the privatization process. In 
addition, this study analyzes in detail the three sectors where most of the privatization took 
place: telecommunications, electricity, and financial services. Those three sectors accounted 
for 80 percent of the total revenue collected during the privatization process.  
In the telecom sector, the Peruvian government sold both Compañía Peruana de 
Teléfonos (CPT) and Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL). CPT provided 
basic telecommunication services in the Lima area, and ENTEL provided national and 
international long distance services, as well as local service for the rest of Peru. Divestiture 
took place in 1994 after an auction to the highest bidder. Using a first-price sealed bid 
mechanism, approximately 35 percent of CPT and ENTEL common shares (the minimum 
required to give the buyer control of the merger) were sold to Spain’s Telefónica de España.
7 
The results of the auction were impressive: Telefónica paid $2.004 million, far larger than the 
second highest bid of $800 million—a bid that was closer to the base price set by the 
government. Soon after buying both companies, Telefónica de España S.A. merged them and 
created  Telefónica del Perú S.A. (TdP). Initially, TdP was granted a five-year national 
monopoly for the provision of lines, local calls, national long distance (NLD) and 
international long distance (ILD) throughout the country.
8 Simultaneously, the government 
created the Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Telecommunications (OSIPTEL). 
The privatization of CPT and ENTEL (now TdP) continued over the following years. 
In 1996, 65 percent of the company’s shares were divided between minor shareholders (36.3 
percent) and the Peruvian government (28.7 percent). The latter decided to sell 26.6 percent 
of its shares to small individual investors through a process known as Sistema de 
Participación Ciudadana (Citizen Participation System). In total, privatization in the telecom 
sector raised US$3.6 billion in revenues and US$1.56 billion in investment commitments for 
the government. 
For the electricity sector, the government approved in 1992 the Law of Electric 
Concessions (DL 25844), which split power generation from electricity distribution and 
transmission. Power generation is a market open to competition, whereas transmission and 
distribution are usually considered natural monopolies. Between 1994 and 1997, the 
government privatized ten SOEs (five in distribution and five in generation) for a total of 
US$1.43 billion. There was also a significant investment commitment to increase the total 
                                                           
7 Telefonica was no stranger to the acquisition of Latin American telecom providers, having already bought the 
former Teléfonos de Chile, currently known as CTC, and Argentina’s ENTEL. 
14capacity of the privatized generation companies by 560 MW. At present, the privatized 
companies represent 64 percent of the total power generation capacity of the National 
Electric System and 79 percent of the distribution service. 
The government also created two regulatory bodies for the electricity sector: the 
Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Energy (OSINERG), and the Commission of 
Energy Tariffs (CTE), which was absorbed later by OSINERG. The privatization process in 
this sector is not yet concluded because one of the south’s major generating enterprises, 
Central Hidroelectrica del Mantaro, and all of the region’s distribution enterprises are not yet 
privatized. However, although the privatization is incomplete, the electric sector has become 
the second largest generator of revenues and investment commitments for the State: US$2.33 
billion in revenue has been collected and US$716 million in investment commitments have 
been promised. 
Water and sanitation is the only public utility where no privatization has occurred. 
Perhaps the only exception was the concession to the Italian Company Impregilo to operate 
wells and a water treatment plant in the river Chillón basin to sell water to the Lima water 
company. However, the government sought to improve the organization and management of 
the system by decentralizing it. This new reform gave municipalities control over water 
services. The only exception was the most important municipal water service, Empresa de 
Servicio de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima (SEDAPAL), which remains a state 
company. SEDAPAL was the only water-service provider included in the privatization 
program, but it has yet to be privatized. Despite this, the government has tried to improve 
SEDAPAL’s services and coverage. Additionally, in 1992 the government created the 
Superintendencia Nacional de Servicios de Saneamiento (SUNASS), the National Office for 
Services of Sanitation, as the regulatory body for this sector. SUNASS is responsible for 
controlling the quality of the service provided, the tariff system and regulation, as well as 
intersector coordination, establishment of norms for the execution of investment plans and 
supervision of those plans. 
With respect to the financial sector, on July 20, 1994, 99.86 percent of the 
government’s shares in Interbanc were auctioned. The winner was a Consortium formed by 
International Financial Holding (Gran Caiman) and IFH Peru S.A., with the advice of Banco 
Osorno and La Union (Chile), for US$51 million (workers paid US$4.83 million for a total of 
9.46 percent of the bank’s shares). Interbanc branches Financiera Peruana (Interfip), 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 Although the monopoly was initially scheduled to expire in June 1999, the TdP moved the expiration forward 
to August, 1st, 1998. 
15Internacional de Inmuebles and Empresas de Servicios Internacionales (Interserv) were also 
included. 
Finally, on April 18, 1995, 60 percent of the shares of Banco Continental were 
awarded to the Consortium formed by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (Spain) and the companies 
Inversiones Breca, Inversiones San Borja, Urbanizadora Jardin and Minsur (all belonging to 
the Brescia Group). In August 1995, in agreement with the Share Purchase Sale Contract of 
Banco Continental, 15,325,388 shares belonging to the State were transferred to Holding 
Continental S.A for US$32 million.
9 By July 21, 1998, the Peruvian government had 




The analysis conducted in this paper determines, from a firm’s perspective, whether the 
privatization of SOEs in Peru and other developing countries is desirable in terms of the 
performance of newly privatized firms. Following Boubakri and Cosset (1998), the paper tries 
to determine whether firms improve their performance after privatization. Firm performance 
was measured by profitability, operating efficiency, capital expenditures, output, employment 
and leverage. The following list, taken from Megginson, Nash and van Randerborgh (1994), 





Proxies  Predicted Relationship
P(1) Profitability  Return on Sales (ROS)=Net Income / Sales ROS  A  >ROS  B 
Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Income/ Total  ROA  A  >ROA  B 
Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/ Equity ROE  A  >ROE  B 
P(2)  Operating  Sales Efficiency (SALEFF)= Sales/Number of Employees SALEFF  A  >SALEFF B
Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF)=Net Income/Number of Employees  NIEFF  A  >NIEFF  B
P(3) Capital  Investment Capital Expenditure to Sales (CESA)= Capital Expenditures/Sales  CESA  A  >CESA  B 
Capital Expenditure to Assets (CETA)=Capital Expenditures/Total Assets CETA  A  >CETA  B 
P(4)  Output  Real Sales (SAL)=Nominal Sales/Consumer Price  SAL  A   ? SAL  B 
P(5) Employment  Total  Employment (EMPL)= Total Number of Employees EMPL  A  <EMPL  B 
P(6) Leverage  Debt to Assets (LEV)=Total Debt/Total Assets  LEV  A  <LEV  B 
Long Term Debt to Equity (LEV2)=Long Term Debt/Equity  LEV2  A  <LEV2  B 
Performance Measure 
 
                                                           
9 This transaction corresponds to the shares not purchased by the workers of Banco Continental and Subsidiaries 
as part of their preferential right conferred by LD 674. In agreement with the contract, these shares had to be 
purchased by Holding Continental S.A. at the auction price. The reception of the duly subscribed share purchase 
sale contracts concluded on July 10. A total of 1,178 employees practiced their preferential right, acquiring a 
total 2,115,700 shares as follows: 379,667 shares were paid in cash for S/.1.8 million, and 1,736,033 shares were 
acquired through sales with installment credits for S/.8.2 million at an effective annual interest rate of 10.03 
percent. 
16Based on these performance measures for most of the firms privatized or awarded in 
concession, the empirical approach consisted of two stages. In the first stage, a simple statistical 
analysis was executed to study the post-privatization changes in firms’ performance. In the 
second approach, a regression analysis was performed controlling most of the differences 
between firms and variables, other than privatization, that could explain the performance of the 
firm. 
The statistical analysis consisted of computing the performance variables for each 
company for a fifteen-year period (1986-2000). Secondly, the means for each performance 
variable (Y) for the pre-privatization and post-privatization periods were computed. 
Furthermore, to avoid any bias resulting from a pre-privatization restructuring of the firm, all 
years prior to the divestiture in which restructuring took place were excluded.
10 After the means 
were calculated, using differences from the sample counterpart of the privatization effect and 
the performance variables, the following was obtained: 
 
            ] [
zation preprivati ization postrpivat Y Y Y − = ∆              (1) 
 
The two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test and the Hotelling test are then used to test 
for significant changes in performance variables after privatization. Nevertheless, both tests 
are based on the assumption that the distributions are normal. If the sample size is small and 
the true distribution of differences is far from normal, the stated probability levels may be 
significantly in error. Specifically, when looking at each individual firm, the central limit 
theorem can not be applied since the sample of years for each is small. For that reason, it is 
necessary to verify the normality of the series. Therefore, the Shapiro-Francia test for 
normality is used.  
When the Shapiro-Francia test rejects the null hypothesis of normality, a non-
parametric test, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistic, is used to formally test the equality 
of the empirical hazards functions of the different pre- and post-privatization performance 
indicators.
11 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
10 The privatization year is the date on which the government sold, for the first time, a certain amount of shares. 
11 The test evaluates the closeness of the distributions   and   by computing the least upper bound 
of all pointwise differences 
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17The above methodology is equivalent to considering the simplest possible model for 
capturing the effect over performance with no regressors; it can easily be derived so that 
performance depends only on the date of the privatization dummy, 
 
0 ) Pr / ( E        Pr , , , , , = + + = t i t i t i t i t i ivat u u n ivatizatio Y γ α          (2) 
 
Nevertheless, the above result is likely to be biased for two reasons. First, the two groups 
may have different characteristics and, thus, different performance behavior. Second, the two 
groups of years may be subject to different shocks. Part of the differences in pre- and post-
privatization performance patterns may simply be a result of these differences. 
An alternative way to solve this problem is to develop a benchmark to control for 
these different characteristics and shocks. In this sense, a difference in difference measure 
was calculated for each economic sector in which privatization was important: 
 
firms notpriv priv pre priv post firms priv priv pre priv post
year year year year
Y Y Y Y Y
  .   . 2 ] [ ] [
− − − − − − − = ∆  (3) 
  
The main caveat of the difference in difference measure is the lack of an appropriate control 
group with which to compare the difference in performance of the privatized firms. It is not 
possible to use an optimal matching methodology such as propensity scores, as detailed in 
Rubin (1974, 1983), Heckman and Smith (1995), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd 
(1996), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999), 
because in all sectors under analysis, except banking, there are not enough cases to find the 
appropriate control group. In this sense, the author will try to reduce this problem by 
complementing the above equations with a regression analysis.  
The regression analysis added to equations 2 and 3 incorporates regressors, which 
control for observable characteristics at the firm level, into the model. It also includes sectoral 
and macroeconomic variables. The latter variables tried to capture different shocks, thereby 
isolating the impact of privatization. 
The regression analysis primarily consisted of an attempt to model each of the 
performance measures (P) as a function of the following variables: 
 
Yi,t = f(Xi,t, Ti,, Pi,t, PI,r, Sj, Rj,  Z,t)            (4) 
 
where Yi,t are the different performance measures previously detailed for firm i in period of 
time t; Xit are firm characteristics; Ti are the characteristics of the privatization process of the 
specific firm; Pi,t is the date in which the firm was privatized or given in concession; Pi,r is a 
18dummy indicating whether the firm is privatized or not;  Sj are variables at the sector level of 
the firm; Rj  are characteristics of the regulatory agency (for details see Guash and Spiller 
(1999), and finally Zt are other controls such as macroeconomic variables. 
Additionally, the author explored interaction effects of the privatization dummy, and 
carried out panel estimations using differences to drop out all firm observed and unobserved 
time invariant fix effects. Therefore, the three econometric specifications regressed are: 
 
t i t j i j t i t i t i Z R T S X t P P , 6 5 4 3 , 2 1 , 0 0 , µ β β β β β β β α + + + + + + + + =   (5) 
t i t j i j t i r i t i t i Z R T S X t P P P , 6 5 4 3 , 2 1 , 0 , 0 0 , µ β β β β β β γ β α + + + + + + + + + =   (6) 
t i t j i j t i
r i t i r i t i t i
Z R T S X
t P tP t P P P
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                                        µ β β β β β
γ γ β γ β α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
   (7) 
 
Equation (5) is the same as equation (2) but includes firm, sector and macroeconomic 
variables and, when available, some variables for the characteristics of the regulatory agency.  
Equation (6) includes a privatization dummy and a control group in the sample to be able to 
carry out a difference in difference estimation as in equation (3), but again with the controls 
previously specified. Finally, equation (7) includes additional interactions of the year-
privatized dummy (Pi,t) and the dummy of whether the firm is privatized or not (Pi,r) includes 
a time trend to capture trend and convergence over time of newly-privatized firms with firms 
in the control group (public firms or already private firms). 
Equations 5, 6, and 7 were estimated using a simple OLS panel data of firms as 
detailed in the data section. In addition, it was necessary to account for unmeasured industry 
and industry/year effects. Making establishment fixed effects allowed the author to drop out 
all firm observed and unobserved time invariant fixed effects. However, since these 
performance models could suffer too from endogeneity problems,
12 simultaneous 
determination and reverse causality of the explanatory variables, following what is now 
standard procedure in the literature of instrumental variables, were used. The latter problems 
arise mainly because the privatization process directly affects most of the explanatory 
variables for many of the performance indicators and therefore, reverse causality or 
simultaneous determination is a latent problem. Additionally, the GMM-IV estimation 
allowed for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. In order to have appropriate instruments, the 
lags of the instrumentalized variables as well as the privatization variables were used. Also, 
to check if the equation is overidentified by an abundance of instruments, a test of 
19
                                                           
12 Heterogeneity may also be present but can be controlled by pooling the data. overidentifying restrictions—Hansen's “J” statistic (1982)—is provided to evaluate the 
validity of the model. If this statistic
13 rejects the null hypothesis, the validity of the model is 
called into question.
14 
Although this estimator is restricted to models linear in the parameters, it is relatively 
more efficient than an OLS with instrumental variables, even with correction for 
heteroskedasticity with the White procedure. The efficiency gain is derived from GMM-IV’s 
use of an optimal weighting matrix
15 (rather than the identity weighting matrix implicit in any 
least squares estimator) to define the appropriate combination of moment conditions. In this 
context, the moment conditions are the orthogonality conditions of each instrument with the 
error process. A discussion of the development of the estimator is given in Greene (2000). 
 
4. The Data 
 
The construction of the database required several sources of statistical information. For the 
pre-privatization period, the primary sources of information were the “White Books”
16 and 
the published histories of the respective firms. This information was complemented by 
sources like the fiscal statistical summary of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, the National 
Institute of Statistics and Computing Statistics, annual economic surveys, and others (for 
further details on data sources, see Appendix 1).  
For the post-privatization period, the author collected information from various 
sources. Again, company histories were an excellent source of information. Data on the 
characteristics of the firms was complemented by statistics from the Supervising Committee 
of Companies and Securities (CONASEV), annual economic surveys, and monthly financial 
reports of the Bank and Insurance Superintendent (SBS). Also, the author collected data for 
sectoral indicators from statistics published by the regulatory agencies (see Appendix 1). It is 
important to mention that the data collected includes information for the period 1986—2000 
in order to provide enough pre-privatization sectoral data. The pre-privatization data allowed 
                                                           
13 This statistic is distributed Chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. 
14 The null hypothesis is that the additional moment conditions are approximately satisfied. 
15 Hansen (1982) showed that the optimal weighting matrix for this class of estimators is W = AsyVar[1/N Z'e], 
where Z is the N x L matrix of instruments and e is the N x 1 matrix of the GMM residuals.  For the procedure 
followed for N observations the optimal W is given by: 
                           N 
        W = (1/N
2) Σzi zi' ei
2 
                          i=1 
where zi is the ith row of Z and ei is the ith element of e. and ivgmm saves W in e(W) .   
 
16 The White Books are a collection of all information available for firms to be privatized. 
20the author to control for the period of restructuring that many enterprises experienced before 
they could be privatized. 
One major problem was the merger, absorption, or division of many companies or 
business units during the privatization process. This activity made it difficult to follow 
companies as a single unit through the privatization process. Two alternative methods were 
adopted to resolve the issue. In the first method, the author aggregated pre-privatization 
accounting information provided in the White Books; the second alternative relied on the fact 
that in most of the privatization agreements, as in the merger of CPT and ENTEL into TdP, 
the privatized entities were required to keep separate accounting books. Thus, the author 
could either aggregate a company’s important data or follow the respective merged unit over 
time. 
A second problem of data collection was that some privatization strategies required 
that SOEs be divided and each individual unit offered separately. The registers kept before 
the privatization processes were based on aggregated data, since all the different business 
units operated as a single enterprise.  However, from the day of the decision to privatize, the 
registers were kept separately for each unit and then consolidated into one record for the 
company. 
Although the companies were considered single units after the privatization process, 
in some cases there existed a combination of private businesses and SOEs that were only 
partially privatized. Mixed ownership in a firm’s record complicated the measurement of the 
impact of privatization. In order to partially control for this problem, the authors generated a 
variable based on the percentage of the firm still owned by the government to measure the 
intensity of the privatization process and added a discrete dummy of the period in which the 
privatization started. 
The final problem was that parts of the SOE portfolios had been liquidated. Those 
companies usually represented inefficient units of SOEs that had not been absorbed by the 
private system. In these cases, when possible, the unit of the company liquidated was 
excluded, or it was assumed that the new private owner decided to shut down that unit for 
efficiency reasons. 
Between the years 1992 and 2000, 185 transactions took place. This process included 
42 SOEs. However, the sample of companies in this paper is less than the total of privatized 
SOEs. Several important reasons exist for not including all of the privatized SOEs in this 
study: 
21•  Some state companies were divided horizontally or vertically in small units 
and privatized separately. In most cases, it was possible to join all the parts 
in which the company was divided and assume that it remains a single 
operating unit. In the case of Telefónica del Perú, information from CPT 
and ENTEL Perú has been added. This was not possible in other cases due 
to lack of information about some of the units into which the company was 
divided. 
 
•  Most of the concessions and projects have not been included due to the lack 
of financial information from the pre-privatization period. 
 
•  Several firms have been liquidated or had their operations stopped. 
 




•  In some cases, information was unavailable. 
 
Despite these limitations, the sample includes 86 percent of the total value of 
transactions undertaken and 47 percent of the companies involved in the process, as seen in 
Table 3. These percentages increase to 91 percent and 63 percent, respectively, when 
liquidated or extinct companies are not considered. Table 4 presents the set of non-financial 




Privatized SOEs Covered in Study 
Total Effective
1/
Number of privatized firms 47.19% 62.69%
Transactions 86.08% 91.30%
1/ Not including liquidated or defunct firms.  
                                                           
17 Among the companies acquired, the most important are: Lar Carbon, Sia and Nisa acquired by Cementos 
Lima; Petrolube, acquired by Mobil Oil; Enata, acquired by Tabacalera del Sur S.A; Compania Minera Mahr 
Tunel and Compania Minera Paragsha, acquired by Volcan, and Planta de Cemento Rioja, acquired by 
Cementos Norte Pacasmayo. 
18 Appendix A.3.1 details all the firms collected for the electric sector. 
22Table 4 
Non-Financial Companies Included in Study 











Empresa Eléctrica de Piura Empresa Eléctrica de Piura 1997-1999
Electro Andes 1997-1999
Electro Centro Electro Centro 1986-1998 1999
Electro Noroeste Electro Noroeste 1986-1998 1999
Electro Norte Electro Norte 1986-1998 1999
Electro Norte Medio Electro Norte Medio 1986-1998 1999
Electro Oriente 1986-1999
Electro Sur 1986-1999
Electro Sur Este 1986-1999
Electro Sur Medio Electro Sur Medio 1986-1996 1997-1999
Etevensa Etevensa 1994-1995 1996-1999
Seal 1986-1999
Cemento Sur Cemento Sur 1986-89, 1994 1996-1998
Cementos Lima Cementos Lima 1987-1993 1994-2000
Cementos Norte Pacasmayo Cementos Norte Pacasmayo 1992-1993 1994-2000
Cemento Yura Yura 1986-1990 1994-1995
Centromín 1986-1990
Sociedad Minera Cerro Verde Sociedad Minera Cerro Verde 1993 1994-96, 1999-00
Compañia Minera Condestable Compañia Minera Condestable 1987-1990 1992-2000
Hierro Perú Shougan Hierro Perú 1986-1990 1998-1999
Minero Perú 1986-1990
Empresa Minera Especial Tintaya 1986-1989
Empresa de la Sal Empresa de la Sal 1991-1994 1995-2000
Petróleos del Perú Petróleos del Perú 1986-1991 1992-1998
Petroperú - Refineria la Pampilla Refineria la Pampilla 1996-1998
Química del Pacífico Química del Pacífico 1988-1992 1993-2000
Certificaciones del Perú Certificaciones del Perú 1991-1993
Reactivos Nacionales Reactivos Nacionales 1987-89, 1991-92 1993-2000
Industrias Navales Industrias Navales 1991-1992 1993-1996
Sudamericana de Fibras Sudamericana de Fibras 1991-1992 1993-1996
Empresa Siderúrgica del Perú Empresa Siderúrgica del Perú 1986-90, 93-95 1996-1997
Solgas 1986-1990
Compañía Peruana de Teléfonos










Non-Financial Companies Not Included in Study 
  Liquidated or Defunct  Divided Land Sales Absorbed by Other Firm Information Unavailable
Minpeco USA Sociedad Paramonga Proyecto Especial Chavimochic Lar Carbón Petrolera Transoceánica
Aero Perú Epsep Tierras del Proyecto Especial Pastogrande  Sia Refineria Cajamarquilla
Petromar Tierras del Proyecto Especial Chinecas Nisa Pesca Perú
Ecasa Tierras del Proyecto Especial Majes-Siguas  Planta de Cemento Rioja Enafer
Flopesca Tierras del Proyecto Especial Jequetepeque-Zaña Petrolube Empresa Minera Yauliyacu
Pesquera Grau  Tierras Eriazas Enata Empresa Radio Panamericana
Fertisa Tierras del Proyecto Especial Chira-Piura  Empresa Minera Mahr Túnel Empresa Difusora Radio Tele
Epersur Empresa Minera Paragsha Pletasa
Plesulsa Planta Lechera de Iquitos
Metaloroya
Amfa
Talleres de Moyopampa 













  24A separate database was constructed for the financial sector. It consists of annual data 
and considers private banks during the period as the control group and the Banco de la Nación 




Privatized Banks Included 
Pre-Privatization  Post-Privatization 
Continental  18/04/95 9 6
Interbank  20/07/94 8 7
Comercio  05/06/92 6 9
Pupular  04/11/93 6 -
Number of Yearly Observations
Bank  Date Privatized
 
 
Appendix 2 gives a detailed explanation of the variables constructed and the manner 
in which they were calculated. Graph 5 plots all of the performance indicators for the entire 
database of privatized firms using a non-parametrical approximation (kernel densities) for the 
distribution of the values of the pre- and post-privatization performance indicators.
19 A clear 
increase (larger for the privatized firms than the SOEs) of the performance indicators can be 
seen since 1994, when the process of privatization accelerated. For some indicators, like 
return to assets, the difference between SOEs and privatized firms is not clear. The latter 
could occur because privatized firms significantly increased their possession of assets. This, 
in turn, reduces the impact of an increase in sales. When looking at employment, income, 
sales and asset efficiency, the positive impact of privatization on the efficiency of firms is 
even more apparent, despite the fact that the reduction in total number of workers is similar 
for both SOEs and privatized firms. 
Furthermore, after analyzing the performance indicators for each individual firm, it 
becomes apparent that the distributions of privatized firms shifted to the right for practically 
all of the performance indicators. This signifies that the mean value of the specific 
performance indicator is bigger than when the firms were SOEs. The profitability ratios and 
the operating efficiency ratios increased after the privatization process. It must be mentioned, 
however, that the positive tendency in profitability ratios emerged a few years before the 
actual process began, since many of the privatized enterprises had to undertake a 
restructuring process instituted through the implementation of reforms in all these sectors.
                                                           
19 An unweighted and locally weighted smoothing is carried out. 
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28Additionally, it should be noted that the profitability indicators for the banks under 
examination showed an important decline a few years after the privatization process. This result 
can be explained by the severe global financial crisis at the end of the 1990s.  
On the other hand, improvement in the operating efficiency ratios demonstrated not 
only a recovery in sales and income of companies across sectors, but also the strong decline in 
post-privatization total employment across sectors. It is worth mentioning that these indicators 
had a positive, but weak, evolution in the years before the privatization process, but only after 
privatization occurred did their pace accelerate. 
The capital-deepening indicator (the ratio of assets to employment) showed a very 
important increase after the privatization process. In all sectors, this indicator was more or less 
stagnant before the process occurred, but afterwards, it started rising very rapidly. Furthermore, 
leverage indicators that had a very negative and unstable tendency before privatization began to 
improve, although not immediately. In all sectors, the negative tendency was reversed in years 
after the privatization process began, but many faced a relapse due to the global financial crisis. 
The means and variances for these ratios during the period of analysis, as well as for the values 
of the most important indicators for all sectors, can be found in Appendix 4. 
It is important to mention that even though businesses in the Sanitation Sector 
(specifically Sedapal) have not been privatized, they are included in this project as a control 
group for the privatized firms in the services sector. Sedapal is used as a control group because 
it is a service, like telephones or electricity, and because it had a similar evolution in 
performance indicators for the pre-privatization period. The latter occurred because the 
government initially prepared Sedapal for privatization also. This similarity presents an 
opportunity to include an “untreated group” (a firm that has not been privatized, such as 
Sedapal) with a similar process of pre-privatization reform comparable to the “treated group” 
(TdP). In the case of electricity, as detailed in Appendix A.3.1, unprivatized firms still exist. 
Thus, there are enough controls to evaluate the impact of privatization under the difference in 
difference methodology. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, the methodologies outlined in section 3 are utilized to analyze the impact of 
the privatization process on firm performance. First, a detailed analysis of performance 
indicators is carried out for all privatized firms, then the three major privatized sectors are 
analyzed: telecommunications, electricity and the financial sector. 
 
29Each of the tables consists of two tests comparing pre- and post-privatization. The 
first test is a first difference analysis using firm and year fixed effects to analyze the 
difference between pre- and post-privatization information for all firms under study. The 
second test is a difference in difference test, as detailed in the methodological section. The 
difference in difference statistic will both test for the change in firm performance compared 
to the privatization period and take into account relative firm performance when compared to 
a control group that did not undergo the privatization process. In the all-firm panel, the 
control groups are all the SOEs present for every year for which information was collected. 
The GNP per capita for each sector is also included to control for the size of the sector to 
which the specific firms belong.  
When analyzing the two principal sectors where privatization took place, the control 
firms were those identified as most similar to the ones under analysis. In the case of 
telecommunications, the control group is Sedapal, the main firm in the Water and Sanitation 
sector. This firm was not privatized but underwent a pre-privatization reform process similar 
to that of the telecommunications firm.
20 In the case of electricity, the control group is a 
group of non-privatized electric companies (Electro Oriente, Electro Sur, Electro Sur Este 
and Electro Sur Medio). Finally, for the case of the two privatized banks, Banco Continental 
and Interbank, two different control groups were used. The first group consisted of all private 
banks in operation between 1986-2000; the comparison was carried out between privatized 
banks and private banks. The second type of control was state-owned bank Banco de la 
Nación. 
Since there were enough private banks to develop the control group, a propensity 
score based on Rubin (1974), Heckman et al. (1995), Heckman et al. (1996), Heckman et al. 
(1997), and Heckman et al. (1999), in which the probability of belonging to the treated group, 
given observable characteristics (inter-bank funds, assets, total liabilities and equity),
21 was 
used as a summary of those characteristics in order to measure the average treatment effect 
on the treated variables in comparison to the performance variables. 
Finally, a regression analysis and the estimation of equation 7 were carried out in 
order to find a possible convergence of performance indicators. The regression analysis also 
allowed controlling for different variables mentioned in the literature that could explain the 
                                                           
20 Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest that sample firms must be matched to control firms with similar pre-event 
performance, which is especially difficult in studies of privatized firms, but Sedapal went through the same 
reform as the privatized firms. 
 
30impact of the privatization of the SOE's. In addition to characteristics of the firm such as size, 
sector GDP and assets over employment, controls that helped measure the size of market 
failure were included. 
As noted above, and as mentioned by Megginson and Netter (2001), welfare theory 
argues that privatization tends to have the greatest positive impact in cases where the role of 
the government in minimizing market failure is the weakest, i.e., for SOEs in competitive 
markets or markets that can readily become competitive. On the other hand, Shleifer (1998) 
and others have argued that both in natural monopolies, where competitive considerations are 
weaker, and markets for public goods, government-owned firms are rarely the appropriate 
solution. Consistent with this literature, the regression analysis includes a set of variables that 
will control for the degree of competition approximated by concentration indices as well as 
variables that will measure the type of regulatory processes that accompanied the 
privatization process.  
 
5.1.  Results for All Privatized Firms 
 
Table 7 presents the results for all of the privatized firms. In the table, first and second 
differences in performance changes are presented using both the mean and the median. The 
second differences are presented using as a control group all the firms not privatized in the 
respective periods of analysis. In all performance indicators and as mentioned in the 
methodological section, a simple regression was carried out (Equation 2) in which fix effects 
were included at the level of the firm (Graph 5 plots each of the indicators). Additionally, a 
test for normality was carried out as well as the Kolgomorov Smironov non-parametric test to 
determine if the difference in the distribution of the performance indicators was significant. 
In all the performance indicators, with the exception of leverage and assets to employee, the 
test showed significant differences. 
Even accounting for the wide range of firms included in the study, the performance 
indicators show a significant improvement after privatization. Specifically, when analyzing 
three basic indicators, sales, cost per unit and labor, the results obtained are as expected: 
privatized firms significantly increase their sales compared to non-privatized firms. At the 
same time, there is a statistically significant reduction in cost per unit. With respect to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
21 For this purpose a probit model was used to estimate the propensity score. For further reference see 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983); Heckman et al. (1996); Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998); Heckman 
et al. (1997); Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998); and Heckman and Smith (1995). 
 
31employment, the expected result occurs: direct employment falls significantly, in line with 
the restructuring process that the privatized firms went through. 
Moreover, the profitability indicators and all the operating efficiency indicators show 
significant improvement for both the privatized firms and in comparison with the non-
privatized firms. In the case of the rate of net income to assets (Net income/PPE)
22, there is no 
significant difference between the pre- and post-privatization periods. This result was 
expected because both the denominator and numerator increase with the privatization given 
the high levels of investments made by new companies in order to increase efficiency. 
                                                           




Performance Changes in Firms After Privatization 
 
Difference in Difference




Median Before Median After t-stat 
3/ t-stat  
3/ 
i. Profitability 
Operating Income / Sales  0,053 0,187 2,70 2,700 
0,083 0,207 5,57 4,850 
Net Income / Sales  -0,293 0,028 2,41 2,410 
-0,128 0,074 0,30 0,300 
Net Income / PPE  -0,062 0,010 1,41 1,410 
-0,027 0,042 1,56 1,090 
ii. Operating Efficiency
Cost per unit  0,947 0,813 -2,70 -2,700 
0,917 0,793 -2,81 -2,980 
Sales/Employee  
1/  110,317 242,909 11,91 11,910 
105,089 249,802 2,12 1,970 
Log (Sales/Employees) 5,336 5,770 10,85 10,850 
5,377 5,789 3,35 2,550 
Sales/PPE 1,215 1,007 -1,43 -1,430 
1,167 0,936 0,25 -0,260 
Log (Sales/PPE)  -0,443 -0,321 1,98 1,980 
-0,377 -0,323 0,14 0,240 
iii. Output 
Log(Sales) 6,590 11,636 8,47 8,470 
7,596 11,674 1,25 0,350 
iv. Labor 
Employee 
 1/  114,621 68,621 -13,93 -13,930 
116,612 67,377 -4,88 -2,740 
Log (Employee)  6,145 5,635 -14,65 -14,650 
6,183 5,622 -0,28 -5,740 
v. Assets 
Log (PPE)  11,641 11,722 0,73 0,730 
11,594 11,768 1,22 0,490 
1/ Index (year 1993 = 100) 
2/ Correspond to the test of significance of an OLS regression with fix-effects.




5.1.1   Results for Services Sector 
 
A detailed analysis of the two major privatized sectors (public services and finance) is carried 
out for the firms included in the panel, and the different time periods over which they were 
privatized. As previously mentioned, these two sectors represent more than 75 percent of the 
total revenue collected by the privatization process. 
The results of estimating equation 7 are shown in Tables 8 and 9.
23 In the case of 
public services (electricity, telephones and water as a control), the results of the privatization 
                                                           
23 As mentioned before, the GMM instrumental variables were carried out to control for heteroskedasticity of 
unknown form. As expected, the results were consistent with the literature; privatized firms are more profitable 
 
33date dummy are only significant for the debt indicators. On the other hand, the time trend is 
positive and significant, which means that over time all the performance measures improved. 
The latter, together with the insignificant dummy that captures the date of privatization, 
suggests that the performance indicators started to improve prior to the privatization process 
and that only the debt indicators improved significantly faster after the privatization process. 
When examining the dummy that captures a firm’s privatization status, through a 
treatment on the treated type of analysis (similar to the second difference) in the ROS, debt 
indicators, sales efficiency, and ratio assets to employment, there is a significant 
improvement with respect to Sedapal, which is used as a control group. This result shows that 
the privatized firms are improving relative to Sedapal. However, the variable of time trend 
times the privatized firm dummy is significant and negative, meaning that over time, the 
privatized firms are converging to the lower performance of Sedapal. The latter result is very 
important, because it sheds light on how in recent years the financial performance of both the 
telephone company and the electric utilities declined, which could be a consequence of 
increased market competition. 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the percent of government participation has a 
negative and significant sign for two of the three profitability indicators (ROS and ROA), 
although it shows a positive and significant sign in sales efficiency and ratio of assets to 
employment. These results sharply contradict expectations. In addition, the dummy variable 
for price cap regulation is significant and positive in the ROE and debt to assets ratio, 
implying that the type of regulation carried out by the regulatory agency also has an 
important impact on firm performance. Finally, the concentration index is not significant, 
possibly because there is competition in the electricity sector, especially in distribution, and a 
monopoly in the telephone sector. 
When examining each of the privatized firms (see Appendix 5 and Tables A.5.1. to 
A.5.5), the results of the first and second difference statistics for the privatized SOEs are 
completely consistent with what the author found in Table 8. In the cases of Telefónica del 
Perú S.A. and Electrolima, both the first and second differences are significant and in the 
expected direction. In the case of the telephone company, only the difference in means in the 
leverage indicators in both the first and second difference were not significant.  
Similarly for Electrolima, all the performance indicators, including leverage, 
improved significantly. This also holds when a control group is included and the second 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and productive than public firms (Boardman and Vining, 1989, Vining and Boardman 1992, and La Porta and 
López-de-Silanes 1999). 
 
34difference is calculated. The profitability ratios moved from being negative in average to 
positive in magnitudes from 8 percent to 20 percent. Furthermore, sales efficiency increased 
by 500 percent and net income efficiency by more than 800 percent. The main explanation 
for such a significant increase in operating efficiency was the reduction of employment by 
more than half (55.6 percent) after privatization. Another significant reduction occurred in 





Dummy for Date of Privatization (fpriv) -0.5355 0.0788 -0.0263 -0.5594 -1.9622 -3.9619 -0.346 4,453.08
(0.8867) (0.1070) (0.1706) (0.2133)** (0.6373)** (324.0414) (186.8696) (4209.4528)
Dummy if Firm is Privatized (epriv) 1.3155 0.0114 -0.008 0.4892 1.4444 233.929 40.0353 5,574.28
(0.4665)** (0.0242) (0.0425) (0.0549)** (0.2800)** (47.0005)** (32.4350) (1,771.8165)**
Time Trend (t) 0.1517 0.0113 0.0176 0.0097 0.0162 34.3105 11.3793 35.6078
(0.0292)** (0.0038)** (0.0063)** (0.0046)* (0.0130) (4.6841)** (2.7264)** (84.3298)
t *fpriv 0.1455 -0.0026 0.0077 0.0502 0.1705 53.5472 13.581 192.7965
(0.0885) (0.0074) (0.0123) (0.0174)** (0.0525)** (28.5794) (15.1040) (372.0849)
t* epriv -0.1305 -0.0067 -0.0093 -0.0345 -0.1115 -26.3847 -6.3136 -443.6183
(0.0425)** (0.0032)* (0.0061) (0.0071)** (0.0306)** (5.0188)** (3.3763) (148.8121)**
Concentration Index -0.004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0017 1.1352 0.1334 -15.8996
(0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0025) (1.0208) (0.4399) (14.9523)
% Change of GDP per Capita 0.0484 0.0012 0.0015 0.0013 0.0033 -0.0098 4.6774 -72.6033
(0.0141)** (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0101) (2.0111) (1.9953)* (66.4124)
% Government Participation 1.1136 -0.0448 -0.0635 0.1108 0.1387 513.6258 104.3681 6,369.42
(0.7313) (0.0184)* (0.0310)* (0.0603) (0.1850) (122.7353)** (78.5154) (1,345.1637)**
Dummy Regulation by Price Cap -0.4064 0.0602 0.1393 0.1374 0.3629 -66.4621 -58.5637 -626.2109
(0.2648) (0.0352) (0.0569)* (0.0622)* (0.1887) (77.8893) (36.9691) (1017.4182)
Dummy Regulation Based on Costs 0.0522 -0.0177 -0.0137 -0.0415 0.0214 222.233 22.2343 -1,485.57
(0.3372) (0.0303) (0.0530) (0.0469) (0.2030) (56.4033)** (39.7200) (1524.1113)
log(Employment) 0.2742 0.0247 0.0463 0.0138 0.0598 104.4154 40.8697 -572.6417
(0.1328)* (0.0094)** (0.0176)** (0.0182) (0.0818) (19.5389)** (13.6881)** (714.1734)
Ratio Assets/Employment -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000)** (0.0000)**
Constant -4.4631 -0.2313 -0.4215 -0.0884 -0.4686 -1,450.22 -505.2756 -1,151.88
(1.5426)** (0.0860)** (0.1583)** (0.1853) (0.6785) (256.1044)** (175.4672)** (6526.9513)
Observations 93 93 93 96 96 98 98 93
Pseudo- R-squared 0.349 0.335 0.335 0.569 0.502 0.741 0.371 0.426
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis and * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent.
Variables log (employment) and loans per worker where instrumented using one period lags and fpriv, epriv) using GMM-IV.
Pseudo R-squared is the R-square using IV regression with robust standard errors.
Ratio Assets/
Employment
Hansen J-statistic (1982) was used to test for overidentifying restrictions and in any case of the null hypothesis that the additional moment conditions are
approximately satisfied was rejected validating the use of our instruments.
Results of Difference in Difference in Differen ormance Indicators of Privatized Services
(Generalized Method of Moments Instrumental Variables Estimator (GMM-IV))









36Although the reduction in employment affected labor productivity, the significant 
improvement of all other performance indicators showed both an increase in labor 
productivity and a total factor productivity increase of Electrolima after the privatization 
process. 
Similarly to Electrolima, Table A.5.3 shows the results for Electroperú, which was 
privatized between 1995 and 1996, two years after Electrolima. The results in this case are 
not as important as in the case of Electrolima. Additionally, only two indicators improved: 
operating efficiency, as observed in the first difference, and debt to assets, as observed in the 
difference in difference when the performance of this firm is compared to other firms not yet 
privatized. The latter can be explained by the fact that the State assumed Electrolima’s long-
term debts just before privatization. These unsatisfactory results could be a consequence of 
the incomplete privatization process in this sector. One of the major generating enterprises, 
“Central Hidroeléctrica del Mantaro,” and all of the distribution enterprises in the south are 
not yet privatized. 
 
5.1.2 Results for the Financial Sector 
 
The results for simple differences in mean for the financial sector were similar to those of the 
public services sector. There was no significant impact on profitability measures and leverage 
indicators, but there was a significant increase in the operating efficiency and coverage of the 
privatized banks (Interbank and Banco Continental). The increase in operating efficiency is 
mainly explained by the 50 percent reduction in employment, which practically duplicates the 
indicators. On the other hand, the difference in difference indicators are similar to the first 
difference indicators when public banks are used as a comparison. When the comparison is 
done with private banks of similar size, the latter still demonstrate better performance 
measures than privatized banks. Finally, when the control group was defined with propensity 
scores, and the difference in difference estimation for privatized banks against matched 
private banks was carried out, the previous results held. 
Furthermore, when analyzing indicators specific to banks, such as personnel expenses 
per employee, bad loan portfolios, administrative expenses, and financial margin per branch, 
an increase in the performance of the first two was discovered. These results even hold for 
personal expenses per employee in the difference in difference indicators despite the fact that 
the comparison group is pre-existing private banks (see Table 9). 
As in the case of public services, the results of estimating equation 7 can be observed 
in Table 10. The table shows that, unlike the results of the service sector, the date of 
 
37privatization (fpriv) is significant for all the performance indicators. This reveals that there 
was an important change after the privatization process. On the other hand, there is no direct 
difference between the privatized (epriv=1) and the already private banks (the control group). 
These results are consistent with the fact that privatized firms are being compared to banks 
that were always private; therefore, their performance will be better or similar to the private 
banks. 
When analyzing the interaction between the time trend and the dummy for privatized 
banks (epriv), there is a significant and positive effect for the return over sales. The latter 
signifies that over time there is an improvement of newly privatized banks compared to 
already private banks. This result reflects a possible convergence of performance. As 
expected, there is also a negative time trend that could be justified with the international 
financial crisis that affected all the banks in the region. Additionally, the interaction between 
the time trend and the year of privatization dummy (fpriv) is significant and negative, 
implying that the growth rate of performance since privatization is declining. However, the 
size of the coefficient is less than a tenth of the coefficient of the date of privatization dummy 
implying that the overall effect of privatization over performance was positive. The latter 








Performance Measure (P i)
1.    Profitability:
                  Return on Sales (ROS) 0,0545 0,0784 -1,320 * 1,743 2,971 0,116  0,476
(0,010) (0,016)
                  Return on Assets (ROA)  0,0112 0,0099 0,383 0,147 0,167 0,314  0,994
(0,002) (0,002)
                  Return on Equity (ROE) 0,1467 0,1193 0,629 0,395 0,429 0,291  0,994
(0,029) (0,027)
2.    Operating Efficiency: 
                  Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) - 1994 S/. Thousands 188,85 404,10 -7,122 *** 50,725 *** 35,071 *** 0,125  0,007 *** 
(17,921) (24,582)
                  Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF)- 1994 S/. Thousands  10,70 22,60 -2,641 ** 6,973 ** 12,031 ** 0,178  0,082 ** 
(2,403) (4,249)
3.     Employment:
                  Total Employment (EMPL) 3132,5 1831,2 7,101 *** 50,419 *** 44,613 *** 0,146  0,001 *** 
(95,085) (177,859)
4.     Leverage: 
                  Debt to Assets (LEV) 0,9125 0,9175 -0,555 0,308 0,758 0,077  0,329
(0,007) (0,002)
                  Debt to Equity (LEV2) 12,134 11,189 0,485 0,235 0,733 0,029  0,476
(1,432) (0,304)
5.     Coverage:
                  Loans per worker (LOAW)  354,17 1440,36 -13,329 *** 177,654 *** 120,006 *** 0,015  0,001 *** 
(40,902) (81,520)
                  Deposit per worker (DEPW) 513,23 1742,60 -9,216 *** 84,940 *** 93,298 *** 0,051  0,001 *** 
(52,243) (154,157)
6.     Indicators specific to banks 
                  Personnel Expenses per Employee  -31,45 -53,48 6,74 *** 45,41 *** 22,79 *** 0,665  0,007 *** 
(1,98) (2,54)
                  Bad Loan Portfolio  0,08 0,08 -0,26 0,07 0,60 0,671  0,721
(0,07) (0,01)
                  Administrative Expenses  0,49 0,42 1,19 1,43 3,91 * 0,010  0,216
(0,04) (0,01)
                  Financial Margin per Branch  1913,80 2374,20 -1,27 1,62 1,30 0,724  0,476
(253,46) (145,10)
Level  of  Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
 Std. Err.   in Parenthesis 
1/ The year of privatization is 1995
2/ t-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N's 
3/ Test of equality: 
Where x be a 1xk matrix of the means and S be the estimated covariance matrix. 
4/Control group based on propensity score matching.










Performance Changes After Privatization - Financial Sector 
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Date of Privatization Dummy (fpriv) 0.3092 0.0538 0.4506 -0.0922 -11.4328 -1.4313 111.1536 -
(0.1237)* (0.0182)** (0.2096)* (0.0323)** (4.1852)** (112.1632 (36.1325)** (627.2483
Dummy if Firm is Privatized (epriv) -0.1219 -0.0114 0.0778 0.0334 7.1600 -96.5512 -40.8681 -27.2020
(0.0508)* (0.0080) (0.0696) (0.0227) (4.0179) (82.2342) (20.4276)* (461.7338
Time Trend (t) -0.0208 -0.0023 -0.0132 -0.0002 -0.0470 6.4866 -2.9459 121.4275
(0.0085)* (0.0009)** (0.0070) (0.0010) (0.0648) (2.8684)* (1.1379)** (19.2942)**
t *fpriv -0.0247 -0.0041 -0.0260 0.0108 1.4272 12.5945 -8.1146 175.8407
(0.0102)* (0.0017)* (0.0185) (0.0036)** (0.5373)** (13.5645) (3.7083)* (77.6577)*
t* epriv 0.0116 0.0014 -0.0096 -0.0054 -1.0251 4.9709 4.2447 -51.8588
(0.0059)* (0.0011) (0.0080) (0.0029) (0.5275) (11.7789) (2.9500) (68.2979)
Participation in Total Credit Allocations -0.1551 0.0567 1.1762 0.0521 12.3772 1748.686 274.5105 14982.404
(share) (0.6042) (0.0601) (0.7128) (0.0696) (6.2735)* (202.0476)** (61.9442)** (1,549.2723)**
% Change of GDP per Capita 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0035 0.0019 0.0754 -12.4515 -1.8681 -56.0758
(0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0006)** (0.0423) (1.8376)** (0.8185)* (9.3183)**
Dummy for Closed State Owned Banks -0.0548 -0.0067 -0.0125 0.0127 1.4007 -76.3966 -24.4158 -67.1054
(0.0301) (0.0048) (0.0818) (0.0106) (1.0590) (27.8619)** (10.8307)* (157.1675
log(Employment) 0.0283 -0.0026 -0.0549 0.0126 0.3098 - -19.1690 -
(0.0451) (0.0045) (0.0479) (0.0055)* (0.3564) (14.6869)** (6.4199)** (97.4552)**
Loans per Worker 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001)* (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant -0.0258 0.0347 0.4267 0.8055 7.0200 878.7896 154.4391 5849.700
(0.2340) (0.0252) (0.2199) (0.0325)** (1.8918)** (95.6279)** (46.8079)** (594.3191)**
Observation 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Pseudo- R-squared 0.111 0.115 0.06 0.162 0.144 0.411 0.146 0.4755
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis and * significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1%.
Variables log (employment) and loans per worker where instrumented using one period lags and fpriv, epriv) using GMM-IV.












Results of Difference in Difference in ce of Performance Indicators of Privatized Banks
(Generalized Method of Moments Instrumental Variables Estimator (GMM-IV))
Hansen J-statistic (1982) was used to test for overidentifying restrictions and in any case of the null
hypothesis that the additional moment conditions are approximately satisfied was rejected, validating the
use of our instruments.
Variables ROS
 
405.2.   Employment 
 
The impact of privatization on the welfare of displaced public workers has received little 
attention in the literature. One of the main problems faced by researchers is the lack of 
available data, since information for displaced workers is provided for only one period of 
time (the moment of displacement from the SOE). In fact, it would require large amounts of 
time, effort and resources to trace displaced public workers for the purpose of analyzing the 
long-term impact of privatization on their welfare and earnings. This is possibly the reason 
why most of the studies analyze the effects of privatization on employment, welfare and 
wage levels using gross national figures or industry and firm information. 
  From the previous results, it is clear that there was a significant reduction in direct 
employment. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 11, average employment fell 35 percent 
compared to the pre-privatization period. However, when the figures are adjusted, the 
average decrease in employment is 0.7 percent higher than the privatized firms’ industry 
average.
24 Decomposing the results into white collar and blue collar employees yields the 
result that unemployment in privatized firms decreased 4.1 percent less than the industry 
average, but the reduction of employment was 17.6 percent higher than the industry average 
for blue collar workers. This result demonstrates that the most important reduction of direct 













                                                           
24 It is important to mention here that Peru had possibly the most restrictive and protective labor legislation in 
Latin America.  After the successive waves of reform in 1991 and 1995, no other country had so liberalized its 
labor market (Lora and Márquez, 1998, Márquez and Pagés, 1998, and Saavedra and Torero, 1999.) Such 




Means of Changes in Employment After Privatization 
Before Privatization After Privatization Change
(1993) (1997) (%)
All mean 2461,17 1605,75 -34,8%
median 2237,50 1393,50 -37,7%
(1508,536) (1300,427)
White-collar mean 2049,17 1387,00 -32,3%
median 1746,50 1102,00 -36,9%
(1457,232) (1153,019)
Blue-collar mean 412,00 218,75 -46,9%
median 210,00 149,50 -28,8%
(495,463) (247,820)
1/ Standard  Deviation in Parenthesis  
Consequently, one of the major criticisms of the privatization process is that a 
significant reduction in the number of employees could be the major reason for the 
improvement in performance, rather than a real increase in total factor productivity. To 
address this issue, the author follows La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) to calculate the 
impact on privatized companies if all the layoffs are included at their original salaries.
25 For 
this purpose, the cost of layoffs was calculated as: (Lpre-L1994)*Wagepre, where Wpre is the 
average wage in the year preceding privatization, Lpre is the average number of employees in 
the years preceding privatization, and L1994 is the level of employment in 1994 after 
privatization. 
The results are shown in Table 12. There is no significant difference between the post-
privatization performance indicators and the post-privatization performance indicators under 
the assumption that there were no layoffs. For utilities, the percentage change in the profit 
indicators goes from –2 percent to –5 percent, while in the case of the banks the impact is 
bigger, averaging –12 percent and –26 percent for Banco Continental and Interbanc, 
respectively. When looking at the percentage change in the net income efficiency, a variable 
that is directly affected by the number of employees, TdP was impacted –12 percent, 
Interbanc –34 percent, and Continental –14 percent. 
                                                           
25 It is important to mention that since privatization, privatized firms’ wages have had significant increases in 
both absolute and relative terms with respect to the industry. On average, salaries increased 180 percent at 
privatized companies and were 91 percent higher than the specific industry average. 
 
42In the case of TdP, contracting service companies created a significant amount of 
indirect employment. These service companies frequently consisted of personnel laid off as a 
result of the privatization. This required an additional exercise that involved subtracting the 
costs from all service payments carried out by the company in order to find the net 
employment layoff. This resulted in a positive percentage change for some of the profitability 
indicators since the wage costs prior to privatization were smaller than what the company 
pays the service companies. Furthermore, the number of employees in the 
telecommunications sector rose from 13,000 employees in 1993 to 34,000 employees in 
1998, according to OSIPTEL. 
In general, for all the companies studied, the results of the modified version of La 
Porta and López-de-Silanes’ (1999) exercise can be explained through the following reasons: 
total wages of laid-off employees represented only 1.4 percent of total sales, since the 
average wages paid prior to privatization were extremely low; there was a significant increase 
in post-privatization sales, which spread labor costs over a wider base; and there was also a 
significant increase in the productivity of other factors, especially capital, because of the 
increase in coverage and the new investments undertaken by privatized firms.
26 
In the case of utility companies, there was a clear and insignificant increase in sales. 
In telecommunications, the teledensity
27 of fixed phones grew from 2.9 in 1993 to 7.8 in 
1998. Similarly, cellular phones grew from 50,000 to 735,000 in the same two years. In the 
electricity sector, the coefficient of electrification grew an average of 27 percent and the 
generation of electricity grew an average of 25 percent as a result of the heavy volume of 
investments (approximately US$682 million). Even more than in telephones and electricity, 
there was an important rebalancing of tariffs see Torero and Pascó-Font (2000), which prior 
to the privatization period were usually 75 percent or less of the costs of producing the 
service. 
In summary, the results show: a clear improvement in firm performance since 
privatization, according to the Megginson et al. (1994) hypothesis; a relative improvement 
compared to control groups; and an improvement in both labor productivity, as a 
consequence of the layoffs, and total factor productivity. 
                                                           
26 It is important to mention that as in La Porta and López de Silanes, the methodology overstates the 
contribution of layoffs given the assumption that laid-off workers had zero productivity. 




ROS ROA ROE Net Income Efficiency ROS ROA ROE Net Income Efficiency
TdP 0.385 0.162 0.287 81.385 0.366 0.155 0.272 71.883
(0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (42.84) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (40.57)
Electrolima 0.170 0.056 0.072 136.742 0.165 0.054 0.069 132.152
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (72.01) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (69.05)
Electroperu 0.257 0.030 0.050 258.850 0.252 0.029 0.049 252.863
(0.22) (0.02) (0.04) (206.78) (0.22) (0.02) (0.04) (206.65)
Sedapal 0.160 0.027 0.034 33.496 0.154 0.026 0.032 25.160
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (7.70) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (11.61)
Continental 0.091 0.011 0.130 23.434 0.080 0.010 0.115 20.051
(0.05) (0.01) (0.09) (13.67) (0.06) (0.01) (0.09) (13.70)
Interbank 0.066 0.010 0.116 17.323 0.048 0.007 0.087 11.457
(0.06) (0.01) (0.10) (14.27) (0.06) (0.01) (0.11) (16.37)
Note: Layoffs are included with the average wage of 1994 and their marginal productivity is assumed to be zero.
All numbers are averages for the post’privatization period (1994-2000).
Impact of Layoffs on Perf e Indicators for Major Privatized Firms




Privatization began in Peru in 1991 in order to generate vital fiscal revenues for the 
government and improve the quality and coverage of infrastructure and other services. 
Privatization took place in the telecommunications, electricity, mining, financial services and 
hydrocarbons sectors. The process was accompanied by sector reforms aimed at establishing 
competitive markets and autonomous regulatory agencies. The result was one of Latin 
America’s greatest privatization success stories. Nevertheless, it is important to note that a 
strong record of economic policy and performance underpinned the success of the 
privatization process. Macroeconomic stability, an open policy-making environment and 
competitive sector markets gave the firms a stable and certain environment through 1998. 
Without such conditions, success would not have been achieved. 
Unfortunately, the depth of the reforms, especially the extent of privatization, was 
uneven across sectors. Despite this reform mixture, the results in terms of improvement on 
the supply side are positive and very significant. The analysis clearly shows a significant 
improvement in firm performance since privatization. 
It is clear from the analysis that privatization had an impact on public utility firms in 
comparison to non-privatized firms that went through a similar pre-privatization 
restructuring. Although over time there was a decrease in performance, implying less profits, 
this could have been the result of an increase in competition in the sector and a slowdown in 
services such as electricity due to the privatization process. 
Comparable results can be found when examining the two major privatized sectors. In 
both the financial and utilities sectors, a positive first difference effect was found. In the 
financial sector, the main difference was the comparison with previously-privatized 
companies. The performance indicators for financial enterprises were better than those of the 
pre-privatization period, but they were not as good as those of the control group (private 
banks). The results also show that privatized banks have a convergence tendency toward the 
best performers in the private sector. The latter is primarily driven by the significant recent 
improvement of Banco Continental. 
It is clear that in the short-run, the impact of privatization on employment is negative 
since SOEs usually hired people based on political rather than technical criteria. The 
privatized firms had to adjust to the new market conditions and reduce the level of 
employment; consequently, only 36 percent (approximately 43,000) of employees kept their 
jobs after the privatization process. Two effects have been demonstrated: a significant 
 
45increase in indirect employment through services and average growth of 28 percent in total 
employment—both direct and indirect—since privatization. Nevertheless, in order to measure 
the real impact on employment in the medium-run, it is inadequate to study only employment 
in a specific sector. One also has to study the effects on other sectors stemming from the 
higher demand for services by the privatized firms. 
Despite the success in terms of firm performance, service quality and consumer 
benefits must be taken into account to make a balanced judgment of the privatization process. 
As mentioned in Torero and Pascó-Font (2001), there exist important problems in the 
privatization process that could explain why positive welfare impacts on consumers were not 
very significant, or were even negative in electricity. Although the electricity sector has 
shown important improvements, the positive effects of privatization have not yet reached 
important regions of urban Peru. This could explain why, on average, consumers are not 
experiencing an increase in welfare. In contrast, telephony is the sector that has experienced 
the most significant improvements since privatization. Both in terms of supply and demand, 
the results show a positive balance, including an increase in progressiveness, for the 
telecommunications sector. However, a significant reduction in household consumer surplus 
has occurred since 1997. 
In summary, improved firm performance clearly suggests the necessity of continuing 
the privatization process, especially in electricity, water, and other SOEs where major 
reforms need to be concluded, or in some cases begun. This is only a supply-side analysis, 
but when combined with results from the demand-side analysis (see Torero, Schroth, and 
Pascó-Font (2000)), it is apparent that firms and regulatory agencies must develop adequate 
policies to facilitate the transfer of performance benefits from privatized firms to consumers. 
In so doing, even further increases in the gains in welfare derived from the process will be 
possible. Policymakers must fortify the regulatory agencies and increase their independence. 
They also must work with privatized firms to identify vulnerable groups and to develop 
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A.1.1. COPRI: White Books 
 
The White Books represent essential information sources for the pre-privatization period. 
The White Books contain a series of valuation studies of privatized companies, financial 
information, engineering, employment, installed capacity, market share and projection 
data, etc. They are the primary source of statistical information for the companies. At the 
same time, it should be mentioned that there are as many White Books as privatization 
processes. At the end of each process, the Special Privatization Committee (CEPRI) is 
charged with publishing the White Book for that particular process. 
In the case of companies that were divided to be privatized, the White Books 
allowed the authors to obtain disaggregated statistical information. Alternatively, in the 
case of the privatization of joint ventures (ie., Entel and CPT), these books permitted the 
the compilation of consolidated financial information. 
 
A.1.2. MITINCI: Yearly Economic Surveys  
 
The Yearly Economic Surveys (EEAs) are carried out each year for every manufacturing 
company in Peru by the Industry, Tourism, Integration and International Commercial 
Negotiation Ministry (MITINCI).  The companies are required by law to answer this 
survey, which consists of three established forms.  Despite this legal requirement, a large 
percentage of companies do not abide by this obligation even after the MITINCI tries to 
follow up with them. 
The first form is sent to companies with a maximum of 4 workers, the second to 
companies with 5 to 19 workers, and the last one to companies with 20 or more workers. 
The surveys differ in size. The survey for small companies has nine chapters, while the 
survey for large companies has 17 chapters. 
This information helps to create a database that identifies all the relevant variables 
of the survey for the years between 1992-1996, as well as the CIIIU 4 digits at company 
level. 
 
Specifically, in the case of companies with 20 or more workers, the chapters in the 
Yearly Economic Surveys include the following information: 
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•  Identification and location of the business or industrial plant.  
•  Sales price list of products manufactured by the business. 
•  Working staff during the year. 
•  Remunerations and other staff expenditures during the year. 
•  Expenditure on electricity. 
•  Expenditures on services carried out by a third party, taxes and diverse 
administration charges paid by the business, and cost of merchandise sold. 
•  Inventory. 
•  Yearly general sales tax, selective consumption tax, special tax and others.  
•  Annual input expenditures. 
•  Annual expenditures on raw materials and auxiliary materials. 
•  Annual expenditures on fuels and lubricants. 
•  Annual production for sale, transfer to or manufacture by a third party.  
•  Annual Intermediate production. 
•  Summary of fixed assets movement. 
•  Summary of accumulated depreciation movement. 
•  Annual real and potential production by main production lines. 
•  Annual net sales and other revenues during the year. 
 
A.1.3. SBS: Monthly Financial Information 
 
The main objective of the Bank and Insurance Superintendence (SBS) is to preserve the 
interest of the depositors, the insured and the members of the Private Pension System.  
The agency’s supervisory duty consists of constantly monitoring the solvency and 
integrity of each of the companies that act in the market. One of its primary missions is to 
generate confidence in the public in relation to the solvency of the financial system. 
Secondarily, it provides adequate and appropriate information for the promotion of 
prudent behavior by economic agents.  
 
A.1.4. MTPS : Pay Roll Summary Sheet  
 
The pay roll summary sheet is a complex directory containing labor information for 
businesses with ten or more workers. This is due to the fact that the Labor Ministry 
requires all such businesses to report their payrolls to the Ministry annually. The authors 
used this data source to access companies’ labor information.    
 
A.1.5. SBS :  Monthly Financial Information 
 
  56The Bank and Insurance Superintendency (SBS) is the agency in charge of the regulation 
and supervision of the Financial System. This information, generated and spread through 
many publications, will be very useful for acquiring information at the bank level, which 
in turn allows for the acquisition of data on financial incomes, capital expenditures, 
assets, personal expenditures, other expenditures, deposits, offerings, financial 
expenditures, interbank deposits, overdue portfolios, number of agencies, number of 
workers and net profit. Additionally, the detailed information provided by the SBS 
simplifies the tracking of the different mergers and takeovers that occurred in the last ten 
years. This is possible due to the fact that The Bank and Insurance Superintendence is in 
charge of consolidating the statistical information of the banks.  
  
A.1.6. CONASEV: Financial Statements of Quoted Companies; Company Ranking, 
1997-99 
 
The National Supervising Committee of Companies and Securities (CONASEV) 
promotes efficiency in the security and product markets through regulation, supervision, 
and diffusion of information. At the same time, this will strengthen the confidence and 
transparency between participants. Every quoted company in the Stock Exchange in Lima 
is forced to give financial and accounting information. On the other hand, CONASEV is 
in charge of spreading this information through periodical publications, through its 
documentation center (CENDOC) or in real time through the Internet. This information is 
useful in this study only for those private companies listed on the stock exchange.   
CONASEV also offers the public a general ranking of the top companies in the 
country for the period 1997-1999 in order to contribute to better knowledge of corporate 
management in the country. The ranking contains information according to income level, 
total assets, net fix assets, patrimony and year outcome, as well as classification by 
economic activity. 
 
A.1.7. OSIPTEL: Reports 
 
The Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Telecommunications (OSIPTEL) is 
easily the most important source of data for the telecommunications sector. Since its 
creation in July 1993, OSIPTEL’s main functions have been the promotion of the 
development of public telecommunication services, protecting consumer rights, and 
  57promotion and guarantee of a free and fair competitive environment.  Throughout its six 
years of institutional life, OSIPTEL has managed to compile and diffuse, through various 
publications, statistical information relevant to the sector.
28 
These publications grant access to relevant sectoral information since 1993. This 
information includes coverage statistics, quality of service, rates, earnings structure, 
efficiency and economic results. 
 
A.1.8. OSINERG:  Reports 
 
The Supervisory Agency for Investment in Energy (OSINERG) is in charge of 
supervising the activities carried out by companies in the sub sectors of electricity and 
hydrocarbons. It is, therefore, a valuable source of information for the energy sector.  
Created December 30, 1996, OSINERG was conceived as an assessment and supervision 
tool to guarantee compliance of rules and contracts with concessionary companies. 
Among other functions, OSINERG supervises compliance with legal and technical 
norms, as well as commitments to the Government made through the electric concessions 
contracts. Furthermore, OSINERG must ensure the protection of consumers’ rights in the 
sub sector of electricity, which includes overseeing the security, quality and continuity of 
the service, and protecting the environment from the possible damages that these 
activities might bring about.  
 
A.1.9. CTE:  Reports 
 
The Commission of Energy Tariffs is a technical and decentralized division of the Energy 
Sector. It is responsible for setting rates for electricity, liquid hydrocarbon transportation, 
natural gas transportation and natural gas distribution. In competitive markets, the 
companies lack influence—at least to a relevant degree—on market prices; on the 
contrary, monopolies have enough market power to fix them. As a consequence, and to 
prevent the user from being adversely affected by the setting of monopoly rates, the CTE 
is in charge of regulating these prices, with rates that reflect the production costs plus a 
reasonable profit margin.  In this way, the benefits are spread out not only between the 
suppliers of the service, but also between the users. 
                                                           
28 A list of some of its more important publications can be found in the Annexes. 
  58Since its establishment in 1999, the CTE has been charged with compiling and 
spreading statistical information relevant to the electric sector through diverse publications. 
It also constituted an important source of information for this research project. 
 
A.1.10. SUNASS: Reports 
 
The National Sanitation Services Superintendence (SUNASS) was created in December 
1992 by the Law Decree Nº 25965. As a regulatory and supervisory agency of sanitation 
services in Peru, SUNASS guarantees the quality of sanitation services, establishes the 
general conditions for the supply of the service, issues complementary norms for the 
organization of the Sanitary Services Enterprises (EPS) and regulation of rates, and 
supervises the fulfillment of service and rate-setting norms. 
Among the publications through which SUNASS releases statistical information, 
its reports are the most important. They provide data on coverage statistics, quality of 
services, rates, structure of earnings, efficiency, economic results, and other topics. 
 
A.1.11. INEI : The National Institute of Statistics and Computing  
 
The National Institute of Statistics and Computing (INEI) is the agency in charge of 
controlling, planning, directing and supervising Peru’s official statistical activities. 
Consequently, it is the primary source of information for sectoral statistics and prices. 
 
A.1.12. BCR:  Non Financial Public Sector Statistical Summary  
 
The aim of the autonomous Central Bank is to preserve monetary stability. Its principal 
functions are the regulation of currency and the financial credit system, the administration 
of the international reserves under its control, and others as described in its Charter. The 
Bank is obliged to inform the country, accurately and periodically, about the state of the 
national finances. Under this obligation, the Bank published until 1989 a Non-Financial 
Public Sector Statistical Summary. This summary contained aggregated and disaggregated 
statistical information on administration of public enterprises. Consequently, it was a 
crucial source of information for the pre-privatization period, along with the White Books.   
Finally, it should be noted that all data presented in this report has been deflated 
using the General Price Index for the year 1994 (GPI). The GPI was used instead of the 
  59Consumer Price Index because it is able to control for periods of hyperinflation, which 
characterized the Peruvian economy during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
  60Appendix 2.Description of Variables 
Variables Description 
   
Performance Variables   
  ROS  The Return of Sales is the ratio of net income to sales.  Net income is equal to total
income minus operating expenses, administrative expenses, plus financial income
minus financial expenses, and net taxes paid.  Sales are equal to the total value of
products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and
discounts. 
  ROA  The Return of Assets is the ratio of net income to Assets.  Net income is defined 
previously.  Assets are the total value of the entire property of the firm on December
31. 
  ROE  The Return of Equity is the ratio of net income to Equity.  Net income is defined
previously. Equity is the value of the participation that the partners or owners have in 
the company. 
  Debt to Assets  Debt to Assets is the ratio of liability to assets.  Liability is the value of the debt owed
by the company.  Assets are defined previously. 
  Debt to Equity  Debt to Equity is the ratio of the liability to equity. 
  Sales  Efficiency  Sales Efficiency is the ratio of sales to employment. Sales are defined previously.
Employment is measured as the total number of employees in the firm. The total
number of employees includes white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. 
  Net Income Efficiency  Net Income Efficiency is the ratio of net income to employment. 
  Total Employment  Total employment is the total number of employees. The employees include white-
collar workers and blue-collar workers at full time. 
  Ratio Assets/ Employment The ratio of assets to employment. This ratio indicates the proportion that on average
would correspond to each employee.  
    
Sector Variables   
  Share rate  The share rate is the ratio of participation of the firm in the sector. In the case of 
utilities, the rate of participation is constructed by the participation of the firm in the
total invoicing of the sector. In other words, it is the ratio of the invoicing of the firm to
the total invoicing of the sector. In the case of banking, the rate is constructed by the 
participation of the bank in the total credit allocations. 
  Concentration Index by 
Sector 
The concentration index of the sector is the CI4. This index is the sum of the share rate
of the four firms with higher participation in the sector. The highest value it can take is 
1, which indicates the existence of a monopoly.  
  Utilities  Dummy that indicates whether or not the firm belongs to the utilities sector.  It takes
the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the utilities sector, and 0 otherwise. 
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Privatization Variables   
  Privatization  Dummy that indicates whether or not the firm is privatized.  It takes the value of 1 if
the firm is privatized from the year of the transaction, and 0 otherwise. 
  Concession  Dummy that indicates if the firm is given in concession. It takes the value of 1 if the
firm is given in concession from the year of the transaction, and 0 otherwise. 
  Value of Transactions   The value of the transactions is the amount in $US millions paid by the investor for the 
available share package.  
  Projected Investment  The projected investment is the amount in $US million that the investor commits to
invest.  
    
Operator's Characteristics   
  Foreign Participation  Dummy that indicates whether or not foreign investors own a majority stake in the 
firm. It takes the value of 1 if foreign investors have the highest percentage of the
stocks, and 0 otherwise. 
  Buyer's Experience  Dummy that indicates whether or not the buyer has experience in the sector.  It takes
the value of 1 if the buyer has previous experience in the sector, and 0 otherwise. 
    
Regulatory Agency Variables 
  Regulated Industry  Dummy that indicates whether or not the firm belongs to a regulated industry.  It takes
the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a regulated industry, and 0 otherwise. 
  Regulatory Agency  Dummy that indicates the existence of a regulatory agency in the sector. It takes the
value of 1 if a regulatory agency operated in the firm's sector in that year, and 0
otherwise. 
  Price Cap Regulation  Dummy that indicates if there is a price cap regulation in the sector. It takes the value
of 1 if there was a price cap regulation that year, and 0 otherwise. 
  Rate of Return Regulation Dummy that indicates if the rate of return in the sector is regulated.  It takes the value 
of 1 if the rate of return is regulated, and 0 otherwise. 
  Discretionary Prices  Dummy that indicates if regulation is managed through discretionary prices.  It takes
the value of 1 if the regulatory agency adopts a discretionary prices regulation in that 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
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Macro Variables   
  Peruvian per Capita Real 
GNP 
Per Capita Real GNP is the Gross Net Product by inhabitant at 1994 prices. 
  Average Precipitation  Average precipitation is the average annual rain precipitation. The rain precipitation is 
measured in cubic millimeters. 
  Average Exchange Rate  The average exchange rate is the annual average exchange rate.  Exchange rate is the
value of US$1 in Nuevos Soles. 
  IPG  A weighted average of individual prices in a particular year, relative to prices in the 
base year (1994). A measure of how much the average price has changed since the base
year. 
  GNP  The Gross Net Product is the value of goods and services produced by a country’s
residents over a year at 1994 prices.  GNP is the sum of consumption, investment, 
government expenses, and export, minus import. 
  Population  Population is the total number of inhabitants in Peru. 
  Agriculture GNP  The Agriculture Gross Net Product is the value of the goods and services produced in 
the agricultural sector over a year at 1994 prices.   
  Fishing GNP  The Fishing Gross Net Product is the value of the goods and services produced in the
fishing sector over a year at 1994 prices.   
  Mining & Hydrocarbons 
GNP 
The Mining and Hydrocarbons Gross Net Product is the value of the goods and services
produced in the mining & hydrocarbons sector over a year at 1994 prices.   
  Manufacturing GNP  The Manufacturing Gross Net Product is the value of the goods and services produced
in the manufacturing sector over a year at 1994 prices.   
  Construction  GNP  The Gross Net Product is the value of the goods and services produced in the
construction sector over a year at 1994 prices.   
  Total Domestic Savings   
(% GNP) 
The change in the value of assets of the economy as a whole. It is calculated as a
percentage of the GNP. 
  Public  Savings  (%  GNP)  The change in the value of assets of Peru’s public sector. It is calculated as a
percentage of the GNP. 
  Private Savings          (% 
GNP) 
The change in the value of assets of Peru’s private sector. It is calculated as a
percentage of the GNP. 
  Total Investment         (% 
GNP) 
The value of the total purchases of capital goods as a percentage of GNP. 
  Public Investment       (% 
GNP) 
The value of the public purchases of capital goods as a percentage of GNP. 
  Private Investment     (% 
GNP) 
The value of the private purchases of capital goods as a percentage of GNP. 
  Current Account Balance 
(% GNP) 
The value of goods produced by domestic residents (including the net factor income 
from abroad) plus net transfers from abroad, less the expenditure by domestic residents
on goods as a percentage of the GNP.  If the Current Account Balance is positive
(negative), then there is a surplus (deficit) in the current account. 
  Trade Balance (% PBI)  Is equal to the value of exports of goods minus the value of imports of goods.  It is
expressed as a percentage of the GNP. 
  Services Balance (% PBI)  Is equal to the value of exports of services minus the value of imports of services. It is 
  63expressed as a percentage of the GNP. 
  Net Factor Income (% 
GNP) 
Net income from factor, labor or capital, which includes claims on assets abroad. It is
calculated as a percentage of the GNP. 
  Current Transfers (% 
GNP) 
Is equal to the value of received foreign assets minus assets transferred outside the
country. 
  Total Export  The value of total exports in $US millions. 
  Total Import  The value of total imports in $US millions. 
  Private and Public Total 
External Debt 
The value of debt contracted with foreign agents by public and private organizations in
$US millions. 
  Public  Total  External  Debt  The value of the debt contracted with foreign agents by the government in $US
millions. 
  RIN  The Net International Reserves are the value in $US millions of liquid assets, including 
international currency, that the Central Bank uses for international transactions. 
  Inflation (%)  Inflation is the percentage change in the general level of prices. The general level of
prices is measured by the IPG. 
  Export (% GNP)  The value of exports as a percentage of the GNP. Exports are goods that are produced
by the residents of a country but are sold to foreigners. 
  Import (% GNP)  The value of imports as a percentage of the GNP. 
  Export + Import (% PBI)  The value of exports plus imports as a percentage of the GNP. 
  Terms of Trade Index  The terms of trade index is the price of Peru’s tradable goods expressed relative to the
price of a market basket of the world’s tradable goods. It is approximated by the ratio 
of Peru’s export prices to import prices. 
  Potable Water  The national production of potable water in a year measured in cubical meters. 
  Electricity  The national production of electricity in a year measured in kilowatts per hour. 
  Telephony  The number of telephone calls in a year. 
  Vital Minimum Wage  Legal Minimum Wage that a firm can pay. 
  Index of Total 
Employment (Jan95=100) 
The number of persons working at jobs in the market sector divided by the number of
workers in January 1995 and multiplied by 100. 
  Strikes  The reported number of strikes in a year. 
  Affected Workers  The total number of workers affected by strikes. 
  Man-hours Lost  This variable is the sum of all lost work hours per worker due to strikes. 
  Subversive Activity  Subversive activity is measured as the number of subversive attacks in a year. 
        
Financial Variables   
  Personal Expenses per 
Employee 
Personal expenses per employee is the ratio of total personal expenses to the total
number of employees. 
  64  Bad Loan Portfolio  Bad Loan Portfolio is the ratio of bad loans to the net loan portfolio. Bad loans are
defined as expired loans plus legal costs. Net loan portfolio is equal to current accounts
less discounts, plus long-term and short-term loans, refinanced loans, mortgage and 
other loans. 
  Administrative  Expenses  Administrative expenses is the ratio of total administrative expenses to financial
income. Administrative expenses are equal to personal expenses plus general expenses
and depreciation and amortization. Financial income is equal to income by 
commissions and interests on loans. 
  Financial Margin per 
Branch 
Financial Margin per Branch is the ratio of financial margin to branch. Financial
margin is equal to financial income less financial expenses. Branch is defined as the 
total number of offices. 
      
    
 
  65Appendix 3 
A.3.1. Electric Sector 
1986 - 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Electroperú Electroperú Electroperú Electroperú Electroperú
Electroperú Electroperú Egenor Egenor Egenor Egenor Egenor
Egesur Egesur Egesur Egesur Egesur
Cahua Cahua Cahua Cahua Cahua
Luz del Sur Luz del Sur Luz del Sur Luz del Sur Luz del Sur Luz del Sur
Electrolima Edegel Edegel Edegel Edegel Edegel Edegel
Edelnor Edelnor Edelnor Edelnor Edelnor Edelnor
Electrolima EDE-Chancay
EDE-Cañete EDE-Cañete EDE-Cañete EDE-Cañete EDE-Cañete
Electro Centro Electro Centro Electro Centro Electro Centro Electro Centro Electro Centro
Electro Nor Oeste Electro Nor Oeste Electro Nor Oeste Electro Nor Oeste Electro Nor Oeste Electro Nor Oeste
Electro Norte Electro Norte Electro Norte Electro Norte Electro Norte Electro Norte
Electro Norte Medio Electro Norte Medio Electro Norte Medio Electro Norte Medio Electro Norte Medio Electro Norte Medio
Electro Oriente Electro Oriente Electro Oriente Electro Oriente Electro Oriente Electro Oriente
Electro Sur Electro Sur Electro Sur Electro Sur Electro Sur Electro Sur
Electro Sur Este Electro Sur Este Electro Sur Este Electro Sur Este Electro Sur Este Electro Sur Este
Electro Sur Medio Electro Sur Medio Electro Sur Medio Electro Sur Medio Electro Sur Medio Electro Sur Medio
Seal Seal Seal Seal Seal Seal Seal
Emsemsa Emsemsa Emsemsa Emsemsa Emsemsa
Etevensa Etevensa Etevensa Etevensa Etevensa
Egasa Egasa Egasa Egasa Egasa
Gera Gera Gera Gera Gera
Egemsa Egemsa Egemsa Egemsa Egemsa
Etecen Etecen Etecen Etecen Etecen
Etesur Etesur Etesur Etesur Etesur
Electro Ucayali Electro Ucayali Electro Ucayali Electro Ucayali Electro Ucayali
Coelvisa Coelvisa Coelvisa Coelvisa
Sers Sers Sers Sers
C.H. Virú












  66A.3.2. Financial Sector 
 
1986 1987 1988 1989  1990
Amazónico  1962  Si  Liquidación Amazónico Amazónico Amazónico Amazónico  Amazónico
America  1966  America America America
Bandesco  1980  Bandesco Bandesco Bandesco Bandesco  Bandesco
Central de Madrid  1984  Central de Madrid Central de Madrid
CCC  1988  CCC  CCC 
Citibank  1920  Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank  Citibank
Comercio  1967  Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio  Comercio
Continental  1951  Si  Privatización Continental Continental Continental Continental  Continental
Continorte  1961  Si  Liquidación Continorte Continorte Continorte Continorte  Continorte
Crédito  1889  Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito  Crédito
De los andes  1962  Si  Liquidación De los andes De los andes De los andes De los andes  De los andes
Del Norte  1960  Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte  Del Norte
Extebandes  1982  Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes  Extebandes
Financiero  1986  Financiero Financiero Financiero  Financiero
Interamericano  1991 
Interandino  1990  Interandino  Interandino
Interbank  1897  Si  Privatización Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank  Interbank
Latino  1982  Latino Latino Latino Latino  Latino
Lima  1952  Lima Lima Lima Lima  Lima 
Londres  1936  Londres Londres
Manhattan  1984  Manhattan
Mercantil  1984  Mercantil Mercantil Mercantil Mercantil  Mercantil
Popular  1889  Si  Liquidación Popular Popular Popular Popular  Popular
Probank  1990  Probank
Sur Perú  1962  Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú  Sur Perú
Surmebanc  1962  Si  Liquidación Surmebanc Surmebanc Surmebanc Surmebanc  Surmebanc
Tokyo  1965  Tokyo Tokyo
Wiese  1943  Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese  Wiese
Sudamericano  1993 
Banex  1993 
Nuevo Mundo  1993 
Del Libertador  1994 
Del Trabajo  1994 
Solventa  1994 
Serbanco  1996 
Boston  1996 
Republica  1980 
Orion  1995 
Del pais  1997 
Mibanco  1998 
BNP-andes  1999 
Source:  Superintendencia  de Banca y Seguros, Memorias 1986-1991.
             Superintendencia  de Banca y Seguros, Información Financiera Mensual 1992-2000.
Evolution of Financial Sector






  671991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Amazónico Amazónico
America
Bandesco Bandesco Bandesco Bandesco Bandesco
Central de Madrid
CCC CCC
Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank Citibank
Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio Comercio
Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental
Continorte Continorte
Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito Crédito
De los Andes De los Andes
Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte Del Norte NBK-Boston
Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Extebandes Standard Standard Standard
Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero Financiero
Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano Interamericano
Interandino Interandino Interandino Interandino Interandino Santander Santander Santander Santander Santander Santander
Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank Interbank
Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino Latino
Lima Lima Lima Lima Lima Lima Lima Lima Lima            Fusión con Wiese
Londres
Manhattan
Mercantil Mercantil Mercantil Mercantil Mercantil Mercantil           Fusión con Santander
Popular Popular
Probank Probank Probank Probank Probank Probank Probank Probank Probank            Fusión con Del Norte
Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú Sur Perú
Surmebanc Surmebanc
Tokyo
Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese Wiese
Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano Sudamericano
Banex Banex Banex Banex Banex Banex Banex
Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo Nuevo Mundo
Del Libertador Del Libertador Del Libertador               Fusión con Sur Peru
Del Trabajo Del Trabajo Del Trabajo Del Trabajo Del Trabajo Del Trabajo Del Trabajo
Solventa Solventa Solventa Solventa Solventa              Fusión con Del Norte
Serbanco Serbanco Serbanco Serbanco Serbanco
Boston Boston Boston Boston Boston Boston
Republica Republica Republica Republica
Orion Orion Orion Orion
Del pais Del pais Del pais         Fusión con Nuevo Mundo
Mibanco Mibanco Mibanco Mibanco
BNP-Andes BNP-Andes BNP-Andes
Source:  Superintendencia  de Banca y Seguros, Memorias
1986-1991.              Superintendencia  de Banca y Seguros, Información Financiera Mensual
Name







  68Appendix 4. Basic Statistics (Means and Standard Deviations) 















Non-Financial Firms 336 -0.2493194 -0.0389506 0.5950617 0.46898 33.37169 369.8179 -43.1846 1336.634 1443.96 -70480 1540130
(0.716) (0.231) (12.183) (0.555) (519.600) (554.375) (262.358) (2,533.352) (3,508.70) 802842 3612434
332 298 297 301 300 317 317 336 296 331 311
Telecommunication
Telefonica 15 0.1743028 0.0770865 0.1358832 0.4623202 1.047343 270.1213 37.45725 10523.47 663.5529 343455 5398240
(0.219) (0.094) (0.167) (0.153) (0.774) (177.889) (51.469) (4,284.891) (490.97) 427695 2266784
Energy
Electro Centro 14 -0.442782 -0.0336314 -0.053096 0.2634567 0.4065865 146.7447 -43.9994 617.5714 722.4821 -31089 388853
(0.763) (0.053) (0.079) (0.144) (0.286) (72.391) (60.796) (150.036) (338.59) 42847 99896
14 10 10 10 10 14 14 14 11 14 11
Electro Nor Oeste 13 -0.6004902 -0.1410099 -0.2587486 0.4593327 1.139803 203.2694 -94.7579 372.4615 695.3607 -35737 240917
(0.952) (0.250) (0.425) (0.181) (1.067) (89.244) (114.649) (87.024) (283.27) 47839 103963
13 10 10 10 10 13 13 13 11 13 11
Electro Norte 14 -0.4727198 -0.1047444 -0.5336266 0.4547396 2.030046 156.8029 -54.04638 326.5 405.5334 -18137 125990
(0.597) (0.081) (1.196) (0.219) (3.999) (85.136) (44.423) (45.996) (135.30) 15795 33007
13 10 10 10 10 13 13 14 11 13 11
Electro Norte Medio 14 -0.3671124 -0.0248074 -0.0663969 0.3872155 1.01031 260.3288 -69.08984 550.3571 1024.264 -41454 468014
(0.664) (0.039) (0.096) (0.242) (1.137) (183.681) (116.459) (140.053) (777.21) 71836 298246
14 10 10 10 10 14 14 14 11 14 11
Electro Oriente 14 -0.4367591 -0.0458596 -0.0736331 0.3292673 0.5553846 237.3511 -84.5527 199.1429 1285.012 -17795 240264
(0.613) (0.040) (0.069) (0.139) (0.390) (86.825) (95.371) (32.330) (475.32) 20692 82307
14 10 10 10 10 14 14 14 11 14 11
Electro Sur 14 -0.4076176 -0.1243156 -0.0095799 0.4194928 0.3329606 187.5237 -50.60007 152 519.9311 -8429 74913
(0.611) (0.229) (0.730) (0.409) (1.715) (67.666) (71.514) (23.416) (327.13) 11603 50539
14 10 10 10 10 14 14 14 11 14 11
Electro Sur Este 14 -0.2829914 -0.0273679 -0.0541556 0.3126861 0.5784778 203.6812 -51.56755 313.2143 778.7391 -16760 233936
(0.464) (0.035) (0.076) (0.213) (0.616) (60.108) (70.129) (35.529) (333.17) 23075 87921
14 10 10 10 10 14 14 14 11 14 11
Electro Sur Medio 14 -0.2475585 -0.0435348 -0.0997691 0.2952759 0.5159004 140.55 -15.69763 367.5 337.8643 -7816 110249
(0.455) (0.081) (0.175) (0.180) (0.473) (74.776) (26.942) (124.886) (135.52) 13078 36632
14 10 10 10 10 14 14 14 13 14 13
Electrolima 14 -0.0306695 0.0121335 0.0115666 0.345301 0.5766408 415.2717 47.69156 3251.786 1370.89 51941 3533158
(0.300) (0.054) (0.082) (0.122) (0.288) (323.148) (94.740) (1,275.973) (967.23) 221382 1480396
Electroperu 14 -0.4751673 0.0098345 0.0165352 0.4529143 0.9051605 540.2886 69.95837 1503.071 8463.11 -26213 12500000
(1.520) (0.026) (0.046) (0.101) (0.474) (497.822) (240.495) (806.171) (3,448.23) 320191 9487072
Sanitation
Sedapal 14 -0.2786477 -0.0020533 -0.0014089 0.1915537 0.2411109 133.7304 -0.535571 2514.143 1059.295 -47248 2500485
(0.701) (0.035) (0.042) (0.047) (0.077) (78.191) (40.119) (954.741) (408.21) 183016 1143402  
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Centromin 5 -0.1332537 -0.0688604 -0.540891 0.8772924 8.169167 1909.095 -206.3774 714 3935.958 -147339 2810561
(0.167) (0.096) (0.703) (0.043) (3.713) (578.950) (257.100) (0.000) (2,321.44) 183552 1657888
Cerro Verde 6 -0.1909331 -0.0951101 -0.1574462 0.4448881 1.025483 257.1431 -25.51694 556.3333 545.4611 -15259 293492
(0.732) (0.360) (0.675) (0.221) (0.749) (127.128) (148.923) (114.880) (347.76) 80744 165074
5556 65 5 6 6 5 6
Condestable 14 -0.0967807 -0.0202723 20.03124 0.7968503 676.51 775.5975 97.32727 28 902.5966 150 24341
(0.447) (0.206) (52.621) (0.233) (2,395.99) (326.462) (160.295) (0.000) (694.27) 5534 13553
14 14 14 14 14 7 7 7 7 13 14
Hierro Peru 8 -0.2928411 -0.0821107 -0.4565211 0.6275598 2.743274 98.71169 -0.3294156 2003.333 177.5791 -26824 493081
(0.601) (0.139) (0.850) (0.199) (2.724) (8.294) (6.732) (145.418) (28.59) 67554 287769
8888 83 3 3 3 8 8
Minero Peru 5 -1.212696 -0.214607 -0.9757489 0.8098281 4.473682 716.9303 -634.9446 984 3152.684 -624833 3102620
(1.814) (0.263) (1.098) (0.042) (1.240) (479.053) (717.658) (0.000) (2,747.58) 706262 2704137
Tintaya 4 -0.1899639 -0.0501089 -0.8048472 -0.231965 13.90178 3292.367 -541.1156 88 21114.6 -47634 1858315
(0.365) (0.080) (1.614) (1.893) (26.505) (786.447) (1,263.796) (0.000) (17,047.68) 111257 1500480
Industry
Cemento Sur 13 0.1352336 0.0591323 0.0760161 0.3650225 0.4066641 198.6824 24.37964 141 270.9168 2873 35505
(0.197) (0.156) (0.264) (0.278) (0.214) (86.868) (36.089) (15.039) (138.58) 4010 14562
8878 78 8 1 3 8 8 8
Cemento Yura 10 -1.152027 -0.0872967 -2.198517 0.6081172 6.184069 299.7802 -274.5071 198.8 1436.217 -56090 284337
(1.650) (0.225) (5.637) (0.222) (12.300) (166.060) (595.652) (10.119) (1,081.74) 119813 220114
7777 77 7 1 0 7 7 7
Cementos Lima 14 0.1443421 0.0796947 0.1152668 0.2405524 0.353121 785.8346 138.6899 340 1886.881 43628 657215
(0.141) (0.069) (0.098) (0.125) (0.239) (268.283) (111.021) (56.829) (1,052.64) 35490 451104
14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
CNP S.A. 15 -0.2344534 -0.0997569 -0.8230885 0.7468356 0.4205876 49.33342 -6.827435 399.2 57.96657 -2157 21189
(0.505) (0.208) (2.467) (0.258) (6.924) (17.349) (12.935) (48.768) (20.28) 4419 5758
9999 99 9 1 5 9 9 9
Cerper 3 0.064921 0.1046582 0.1760848 0.4124866 0.7074616 0 0 0 0 1213 11460
(0.095) (0.128) (0.223) (0.041) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) 1469 217
Sider Peru S.A. 12 -0.1491934 -0.0506708 -0.1046823 0.5050244 1.414001 138.7289 -14.74069 3271.167 262.6793 -73433 848168
(0.555) (0.213) (0.758) (0.192) (1.167) (64.262) (47.501) (1,052.985) (166.00) 153536 724436
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 12 10 10 10
Empresa de la Sal 10 -0.0509581 -0.0228022 -0.0411322 0.3581276 0.5754323 113.0404 -1.782991 186.6 162.0986 -458 19505
(0.160) (0.094) (0.153) (0.071) (0.176) (60.389) (11.856) (147.113) (90.17) 1858 1952
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Industrias Navales 6 0.0179527 0.0689295 0.0624727 0.3331735 0.674707 90.09027 6.621975 34.16667 140.9403 279 4483
(0.373) (0.123) (0.284) (0.199) (0.730) (40.562) (22.174) (13.288) (48.94) 657 1076  
  70 
 
Appendix 4 (continued) 
















La Pampilla 1 0.0238506 0.0245851 0.0385072 0.361546 0.5662834 1486.441 35.45257 341 1442.036 12089 491734
... . .. . . . . .
Petroperu S.A. 13 -0.5401705 -0.4032016 -1.394297 1.421697 2.454934 1055.132 -274.6417 4772.308 793.4588 -1592135 3835390
(1.099) (0.805) (2.279) (2.040) (11.699) (1,216.418) (657.354) (1,733.099) (759.62) 3759827 4588286
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Quimica del Pacifico 6 0.1293092 0.0813118 0.1184589 0.3138721 0.4973785 154.6838 18.94553 323 210.6251 6379 66508
(0.108) (0.046) (0.063) (0.108) (0.305) (77.205) (19.408) (95.180) (117.05) 8553 49123
Renasa 13 0.0497724 0.0241934 0.0415194 0.3568842 0.5757962 170.5299 7.393634 82.15385 221.9594 1235 17262
(0.209) (0.136) (0.207) (0.078) (0.189) (64.515) (33.134) (31.241) (93.80) 4067 10391
SEAL 14 -0.2235636 -0.0047941 -0.0166959 0.3767928 0.7812843 263.4491 -27.68549 432.6429 636.3682 -16490 245730
(0.383) (0.063) (0.112) (0.169) (0.770) (167.862) (54.206) (146.531) (351.27) 27328 185602
14 10 10 11 11 14 14 14 11 14 11
Solgas 5 -0.0025543 0.042019 0.0596 0.322689 1.7432 309.3359 -0.8520609 230 184.3473 -196 42403
(0.075) (0.126) (0.143) (0.351) (3.321) (154.645) (29.099) (0.000) (124.02) 6694 28530
Sufisa 6 -0.0471735 -0.0751745 -8.294297 0.7574187 24.46572 339.4731 -6.460945 401.1667 451.7127 -7384 159632
(0.184) (0.199) (20.302) (0.317) (46.826) (81.743) (51.927) (124.370) (236.92) 26100 47332
Financial Firms 340 0.7246747 0.0795942 1.599587 0.8831061 9.461535 277.6275 269.9395 1178.735 1636.413 1904351 1738226
(12.848) (1.320) (27.996) (0.069) (4.433) (182.053) (4,621.284) (1,573.675) (1,182.42) 34800000 2983462
Continental 15 0.0797 0.0119 0.16654 0.9198 13.073 273.887 18.7155 2912.733 1656.867 52323 4491742
(0.050) (0.008) (0.112) (0.024) (6.101) (109.476) (12.731) (491.963) (923.11) 34154 1929788
Interbank 15 0.05645 0.01095 0.12074 0.90827 10.3129 254.6527 12.84644 2360.867 1310.12 28045 2408220
(0.048) (0.010) (0.103) (0.019) (2.219) (141.650) (12.246) (911.153) (974.21) 27476 886993
* Standard Deviation in parentheses
When there was a difference in the number of the observations for each variable they are indicated in italics under the standard deviation of the variable.  




Performance Measure (P )
1.    Profitability:
Return on Sales (ROS) -0,0099 0,4083 -10,2639*** 105,3480*** 49,6114 *** 0,1974 0,001 ***
(0,029) (0,028)
Return on Assets (ROA) 0,0024 0,1714 -6,9935 *** 48,9086 *** 24,4539 *** 0,3279 0,001 ***
(0,014) (0,021)
Return on Equity (ROE) 0,0036 0,3128 -7,8995 *** 62,4022 *** 33,4508 *** 0,2083 0,007 ***
(0,032) (0,014)
2.    Operating Efficiency:
                  Sales Efficiency (SALEFF)-1994S/.Thousands 143,918 455,3162 -6,3317 *** 40,0909 *** 42,5110 *** 0,0382 0,007 ***
(23,373) (47,931)
                  Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) -1994S/.Thousands -0,9794 93,7577 *** *** -8,3231 69,2732 47,2743 *** 0,0299 0,008 ***
(3,662) (12,355)
3.     Employment:
 Total Employment (EMPL) *** *** *** 14125,6 5992,17 9,9687 99,3749 38,4810 0,1090 0,001 ***
(575,074) (543,713)
0,9228
0,5444 0,2964 1,9149 0,8725 0,921
0,7603 0,5781 1,6069 0,0026 0,921
4.      Leverage:
                  Debt to Assets (LEV)








5.      Coverage:
                  Lines per worker (LINES) 39,6038 261,0051 -8,0536*** 64,8610 *** 0,0047 0,001 ***
(9,763) (78,008)
Level  of  Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
1/ Standard Error in Parenthesis
2/ t-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N’s.
4/ The year or privatization is 1994.
5/ Shapiro-Francia test for normality. Ho: variable is normally distributed.
3/ Test of equality
 Where x is a 1xk matrix of the means and S is the estimated covariance matrix.
Hotelling
Means Diff. in Diff. First Differences
Kolmorogrov
Smirnov6
Performance Changes of Telefonica After Privatization - Telecommunication Sector
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-0,1811 0,2018 -2,6239 ** 6,8848 ** 3,6440 * 0,0032 0,017 ***
(0,320) (0,024)
-0,0205 0,0661 -4,2075 *** 17,7033 *** 7,5367 ** 0,2327 0,017 ***
(0,016) (0,004)
-0,0335 0,0850 -3,2998 *** 10,8884 *** 2,4812 0,0583 0,017 ***
(0,028) (0,005)
162,9284 803,5256 -12,5352 *** 157,1316 *** 119,0269 *** 0,0155 0,002 ***
(16,391) (60,559)
-19,0959 163,0455 -9,4166 *** 88,6730 *** 33,3117 *** 0,0424 0,017 ***
(11,569) (16,074)
4210,3 1855,60 7,2221 *** 52,1582 *** 50,8770 *** 0,1292 0,002 ***
(239,607) (138,342)
0,4302 0,2208 5,1558 *** 26,5819 *** 15,2595 *** 0,6949 0,001 ***
(0,023) (0,037)
0,7739 0,2952 4,7567 *** 22,6259 *** 48,3539 *** 0,8744 0,002 ***
(0,069) (0,062)
229,3598 794,4770 -8,8517 *** 78,3535 *** 0,0183 0,002 ***
(57,742) (169,273)
Level  of  Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 4/ The year of privatization is 1994.
2/ t-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N’s
5/ The control group is Electro Oriente, Electro Sur, and Electro Sur
Este, and Electro Sur Medio for Saleff, Nieff and Empl.
3/ Test of equality: 6/ ShapiroFrancia test for normality.  Ho: variable is normally distributed.
Where x is a 1xk matrix of the means and S is the estimated covariance matrix.
T-test
 2
Means Diff. in Diff. First Differences
Kolmorogrov
Smirnov    7
Performance Changes of Electrolima After Privatization – Electric Sector
(Difference between Means and Difference in Difference Tests)
Pre-Privatization Post-Privatization
Hotelling
Public   5 Hotelling
  3
() () ' 2 1
1
2 1
2 x x S x x T − − =
−
Performance Measure (P )
1.    Profitability:
Return on Sales (ROS)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
2.    Operating Efficiency:
                 Sales Efficiency (SALEFF)-1994S/.Thousands
                 Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) -1994S/.Thousands
3.     Employment:
 Total Employment (EMPL)
4.      Leverage:
                  Debt to Assets (LEV)
                  Debt to Equity (LEV2)
5.      Coverage:
                  Lines per worker (LINES)
1/ Standard  Error in Parenthesis
  3
 
  73Table A.5.3 
Sector S-Francia6
Prob>z
1.    Profitability:
Return on Sales (ROS) -0,8485 0,2229 -1,1486 1,3194 1,6025 0,0001 0,274
(0,605) (0,096)
                  Return on Assets (ROA) 0,0008 0,0300 -1,9676 * 3,8716 * 1,6639 0,4842 0,234
(0,008) (0,012)
                  Return on Equity (ROE) 0,0021 0,0483 -1,7341 3,0070 0,2457 0,5607 0,234
(0,015) (0,021)
2.    Operating Efficiency:
                  Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) - 1994 S/. Thousands 205,7400 1222,7810 -10,7568 *** 115,7089 *** 45,2077 *** 0,0177 0,003 ***
(57,770) (51,656)
                  Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF)- 1994 S/. Thousands -26,6490 285,7193 -2,4842 ** 6,1711 ** 3,3408 * 0,6345 0,197
(65,580) (119,717)
3.     Employment:
                  Total Employment (EMPL) 1976,7 593,00 4,6217 *** 21,3599 *** 9,9168 *** 0,3306 0,003 ***
(194,342) (30,257)
4.     Leverage:
                  Debt to Assets (LEV) 0,4757 0,4010 1,1977 1,4345 3,5220 * 0,0858 0,749
(0,035) (0,049)
                  Debt to Equity (LEV2) 1,0039 0,7000 1,0279 1,0565 2,4812 0,0005 0,749
(0,185) (0,125)
5.     Coverage:
                  Lines per worker (LINES) 0,0034 0,0216 -6,8787 *** 47,3159 *** 0,0031 0,003 ***
(0,002) (0,008)
Level  of  Significance: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%
1/ Standard  Error in Parenthesis
2/ t-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N's 4/ The year of privatization is 1995
3/ Test of equality: 5/ The control group is Electro Oriente, Electro Sur, and Electro Sur Este;
and Electro Sur Medio for Saleff, Nieff and Empl.
6/ Shapiro-Francia test for normality.  Ho: variable is normally
di ib d Where x be a 1xk matrix of the means and S be the estimated covariance
Hotelling3
Means First Differences Diff. in Diff.
Kolmorogrov-
Smirnov7
Performance Changes of Electroperu After Privatization - Electric Sector
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